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Abstract
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The relatively slow pace of Nigeria’s development has 
often been attributed to the phenomenon of the resource 
curse whereby the nature of the state as a “rentier” 
dilutes accountability for development and political 
actors are able to manipulate institutions to sustain poor 
governance. The impact of the political elite’s resource-
control and allocation of revenues on core democratic 
mechanisms is central to understand the obstacles 
to development and governance failure.  Given that 
problems of petroleum sector governance are extremely 
entrenched in Nigeria, the key question is whether 
and how it is possible to get out of a poor equilibrium 
after fifty years of oil production. This paper uses a 
political economy perspective to analyze the governance 
weaknesses along the petroleum sector value chain and 
attempts to establish the links between challenges in 
sector regulation and the following major political and 
economic attributes: (i) strong executive control on 
This paper is a product of the Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit, Africa Retgion. It is part of a larger effort 
by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at tle@worldbank.org.  
petroleum governance in a political environment of weak 
checks and balances; (ii) regulatory and operating roles 
bundled into one institution, thereby creating conflict of 
interest; and (iii) manipulation of elections and political 
appointments. 
   The restoration of democratic government has helped 
improve transparency and management of oil revenue 
and reforms at the federal level and proposed reforms of 
the petroleum sector hold much promise. At the same 
time, the judiciary has started to restore confidence that 
it will serve as a check and balance on the executive and 
the electoral process. Yet, these reforms are fragile and 
need to be deepened and institutionalized. They must 
be addressed not as purely technocratic matters but as 
issues of political economy and vested interests that 
must, through regulation and reform, be aligned with the 
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I.  Introduction  
1.  Nigeria is recognized as a country with the most known reserves of petroleum and gas in 
Sub-Saharan  Africa.    Petroleum  has  long  become  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  national 
economy, accounting for more than half of GDP, about 85 percent of government revenues, and 
over 90 percent of exports. Since oil was discovered in Nigeria more than five decades ago, the 
country has had a turbulent and disappointing development record and remains significantly oil-
dependent. The scramble for control of natural resource rents has contributed to weak oil sector 
governance and to political upheavals and conflicts. These natural resource control-conflicts played 
out in the Biafran civil war, persistent conflict in the Niger Delta and undermined governance and 
service delivery, especially in the oil producing states. Over the last decade, Nigeria has shown some 
signs  of  improving  governance,  including  the  return  to  democratic  rule  since  1999  and  the 
restoration  of  key  principles  of  macroeconomic  management  (World  Bank  2009a).  Since  2003, 
Nigeria has embarked on an ambitious agenda of reforms aimed at enhancing governance in public 
financial management (PFM), banking services, power and telecommunications infrastructures, and 
transparency and accountability in the oil sector. The reforms have led to strong economic growth 
during 2003–07.  
2.  Despite these reforms, Nigeria remains a poor country with more than half of its population 
living  below the  poverty line and 35  percent  living  in  conditions of extreme poverty  (National 
Planning  Commission  2007).  Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  per  capita  has  remained  almost 
unchanged (still below US$1,200) and there are few signs of multiplier effects from the oil industry.
1 
For the majority of the population, few , if any, benefits from the oil industry have been realized. 
Public infrastructure has either declined severely or is in a state of collapse, and the unreliability of 
critical public utilities such as electr icity is a primary reason why  most manufacturing firms have 
closed (Borodo 2009).
2  
3.  A country may struggle to turn petroleum revenues into sustainable development for the 
society at large for many reasons. The case of Nigeria, however, provides clear evidence of the 
failure to establish accountable institutions that would ensure governance in the public interest. At 
the time of the significant discovery of oil and its export in the 196os and 70s, Nigeria had military 
dictatorships for the most of the period and institutions were either weak or not put in place to 
manage the resources.  This translated into a non-transparent oil sector and revenue management, 
and  developed  an  environment  in  which  politicians  could  benefit  from  nondemocratic  power 
building. Democracy never had an opportunity to establish and sustain itself prior to 1999 and, as a 
result, a culture of political and bureaucratic accountability did not develop. Opportunities for rent-
seeking have distorted incentives throughout the extractive industries value chain—including, for 
example,    oil  block  awards  and  licensing,  in  regulatory  institutions,  in  tax  administration,  for 
governors at the state level, among oil producers, and in Niger Delta communities. Representatives 
of political and military elites are believed to have accumulated hundreds of billions of Nigeria‘s oil 
dollars in foreign bank accounts. 
4.  The government is taking steps to improve transparency and accountability. Nigeria was the 
first country to endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and it intends to 
subscribe to the Stolen Assets Recovery (STAR) Initiative.
3 In contrast to other natural resource-rich 
countries, Nigeria has introduced anticorruption initiatives that potentially expose corrupt politicians   8 
to the risk of being arrested and prosecuted. The late President Yar‘Adua acknowledged that the 
fight against corruption will have to begin with the oil industry. In a December 15, 2007 interview 
with This Day newspaper, he declared that the government ―has identified the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) as one of the main focal points of his administration‘s war against 
corruption‖ and he admitted in reference to the NNPC that ―it has not been transparent, and it is 
one of the most difficult agencies of [the] government to tackle because of vested interests of very 
powerful people in the country.‖  
5.  All advisors to Nigeria‘s policy-makers have consistently emphasized the critical importance 
of  better  governance  in  general  and  in  the  oil  industry  in  particular,  but  initiatives  have  been 
implemented  without  much  success.  Currently,  however,  two  particularly  important  efforts  are 
under way. The first, a new petroleum law, is motivated by the government‘s stated intention to 
fundamentally reform the petroleum sector. The law has been drafted to completely overhaul sector 
governance and is currently being considered by the Parliament. The second government effort is 
targeted at reestablishing control over the Niger Delta, where most of the oil is being produced and 
where violence  has severely disrupted oil production. In parallel, the government, in July 2009, 
offered a general amnesty to all militant groups  in the region   and a rehabilitation program in return 
for their giving up the armed struggle and turning in weapons. Niger Delta is one of the three key 
priorities of the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan who succeeded Umaru Yaradua and 
has continued with the post-amnesty program. The development of Nigeria over the next few years 
depends very much on the outcome of these two efforts. Whether these initiatives succeed, or 
whether they will be interrupted by the efforts of those who see their access to rents and political 
influence diminished, will depend on how the political dynamics evolve over the coming years. 
II.  Political Economy of Petroleum Management 
6.  Oil  was  discovered  in  Nigeria  in  1956.  Oil  exports  started  two  years  later,  and  has 
contributed substantial revenues. Since 1970, incomes from oil have marked Nigeria as a country 
with  huge  development  potential,  having  one  of  the  world‘s  largest  deposits  of  hydrocarbons. 
Drilling activities are ongoing or planned in seven primary sedimentary basins, but most of Nigeria‘s 
current oil production is concentrated in the Niger Delta (see Azaiki 2007 and Ariweriokuma 2009).
 
The government‘s policy was to achieve an oil reserve base of 40 billion barrels by 2010, but this 
target has long been undermined by the escalation of violence  in  the  Niger Delta  prior to the 
amnesty, controversy surrounding the latest licensing rounds, and uncertainties regarding the future 
tax regime because of the pending Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Thus, although Nigeria is rich in 
petroleum resource as a result of its geological endowment, the fact that it remains highly dependent 
on petroleum reflects its failure to manage these resources to develop a broad-based economy.  
Sector Background 
7.  Nigeria is one of Africa‘s leading crude producers and in 2009 accounted for a fifth of 
African and 3 percent of world crude production (USGS 2009).  The country is also endowed with 
sizable deposits of aluminum, gold, tin, iron ore, coal, niobium, lead, and zinc (Table 1).    9 
Table 1: Estimated Production of Mineral Commodities 
Commodity     2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Aluminum  metric tons  --   --   --   10,600  13,000 
Gold   kilograms  30  50  180  200  100 
Iron ore, gross weight  thousand metric tons  60  88  58  62  99 
Lead:  metric tons                
Lead-zinc ore  metric tons  --   492,000  582,000  644,000  600,000 
Metal, refined   metric tons  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000 
Tin:                   
Gross weight   metric tons  1,700  1,818  229  240  230 
Sn content   metric tons  1,300  1,400  180  185  180 
Cement, hydraulic   thousand metric tons  2,700  3,300  4,700  5,000  5,000 
Gypsum   metric tons  150,000  169,000  579,000  300,000  300,000 
Coal, bituminous   metric tons  8,000  530,000  530,000  500,000  450,000 
Natural gas:              
Gross  million cubic meters  59,285  82,064  84,707  80,604  64,883 
Dry   million cubic meters  36,282  53,479  57,400  58,793  46,895 
Petroleum:              
Crude   thousand 42-gallon barrels  923,500  869,197  803,000  768,800  780,348 
Refinery products:  thousand 42-gallon barrels  64,900  39,400  18,012  33,147  15,771 
Source: USGS 2009. 
8.  Oil and gas production is concentrated in 9 out of 36 states in Nigeria—Abia, Akwa Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers, with the five core states accounting for 
more than two-thirds of production. The Niger Delta basin is the largest along the West African 
coast; it has 246 production fields and 3,446 active wells. According to the estimates by BP (2010), 
Nigeria has proven reserves of over 37 billion of petroleum barrels and more than 5 trillion of cubic 
meters of natural gas in 2008 (Figures 1-2). Nonetheless, while proven reserves of petroleum have 
risen steadily, petroleum production fluctuates during 1996-2008 and notably took a dip from 900 
million  barrels  in  2004  to  below  800  million  barrels  in  2008.  For  natural  gas,  proven  reserves 
increase substantially from 1.2 trillion cubic meters in 1980 to 5.2 trillion cubic meters in 2008 which 
is in sharp contrast with the modest increase in other Africa‘s proven reserves during the same 
period.   10 
Figure  1:  Petroleum  Proven  Reserves  and 
Production (1980-2009) 
Figure  2:  Natural  Gas  Proven  Reserves 
(1980-2009) 
   
Sources: BP 2010.  Sources: BP 2010. 
9.  Approximately 70 percent of Nigeria‘s oil production is accomplished by joint ventures (JVs) 
and  another  25  percent  by  production-sharing  contracts  (PSCs).  Five  major  international  oil 
companies (IOCs)—Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-Texaco, Total, and Agip—currently are engaged 
in JV operations with the Nigerian government. In these JVs, the Nigerian government (via NNPC) 
holds  60  percent  of  the  equity.  The  government  has  created  many  efforts  to  bring  indigenous 
companies into oil production via marginal fields and other schemes, but so far they are not major 
players in the industry. 
10.  The Federal Government holds all mineral rights and is responsible for the allocation of 
exploration and development licenses.  Oil revenue consistently accounts for over two thirds of 
public revenues. Similarly, oil and gas exports accounted for 97 percent of total exports in 2008-
2009 (Figure 3). While rents have increased by almost fourfold from US$ 20 billion in 2000  to 47 
billion in 2008, petroleum rents as a share of gross national income has generally decreased during 
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Figure  3:  Contributions  of  the  Petroleum 
Sector (2000-2008) 
Figure 4: Petroleum Rents (2000-2008) 
   
Sources: IMF 2009.  Source: Wealth of Nations 2010. 
Political Economy Context 
11.  The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) has an area of 923.800 sq. km. and 148 million 
inhabitants.  There are 389 different ethnic groups, but the largest are Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, 
and Kanuri.  The Nigerian economy is heavily dominated by oil and gas production and agriculture 
is the second economic activity representing 30 percent of the national GDP and employs two-
thirds of economically active population, though the sector has deteriorated sharply since the 1970s 
due to inadequate governmental policies and the shift to an oil economy.  
12.  Nigeria  was  a  British  colony  until  1960  when  it  became  independent  under  a  federal 
constitution.  The country has experienced several military regimes (1966–79 and 1984–99) and a 30-
month civil war (1967–70). In 1999, Nigeria returned to a democratic system and has since held 
three presidential and parliamentary elections, resulting in the first-ever handover from one civilian 
president to another in 2007.  
13.  In terms of political organization, Nigeria has a three-tier government.  The country has a 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and 36 states, which are subdivided into 774 local governments.  
The National Assembly is bicameral.  For most of its history Nigeria has had a local government 
structure  parallel  to  the  central  government.  Nonetheless,  the  number  of  tiers  and  local 
governments, as well as the distribution of public revenue and responsibilities among these, has 
changed substantively throughout its history (Adedokun 2004).  During the early colonial period, 
local-self government was institutionalized by the Native Administration Ordinance No. 4 of 1916.  
This led to the emergence of different practices of indirect rule across the three traditional regions -
Eastern,  Western,  and  Northern.  In  the  1950s,  the  Eastern  and  Western  regions  increased  the 
number of elected councils responsible for local government, while the Northern region retained a 
system of local government based on the traditional authority of Emirs.  These systems did not 
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14.  As Diprose (2008) explains, in 1966 a military regime restructured the federation and created 
12 states to give more autonomy to minority ethnic groups.  The existing  local governments were 
put under their control.  However, there was no uniform system and the South-eastern states used a 
deconcentration  model, while the predominantly Muslims Northern  states continued to use  the 
Emirs as the prevailing political and religious authority at the local level.  In 1976, the government 
passed a comprehensive decentralization program and increased the number of states to 19 and the 
local  government  areas  (LGAs)  to  301.    These  were  given  administrative,  political,  and  fiscal 
responsibilities later recognized by the 1979 Constitution.  Local councils were elected by direct vote 
and had guaranteed funding from the Federation Account.  After a new coup, the Babangida regime 
created new LGAs and states in 1987 and in 1991.  In 1993 and in 1996, the General Sani Abacha 
regime  also  created  new  LGAs.    The  manipulation  of  LGAs  responded  mainly  to  the  central 
government‘s  need  of  gaining  political  legitimacy  from  traditional  rulers,  while  efficiency 
considerations were only secondary.  A number of violent confrontations were triggered as a result 
of the disregard to historic grievances with which some of the local governments were delineated 
and of growing perceptions of inequality among groups that resulted from the political division of 
areas (Diprose 2008).   
15.  In 1999, a new constitution was adopted following the organization established by General 
Abacha‘s 1996 decree.  The constitution continued to favor the North in the number of its LGAs.  
The North has 20 states (including the Federal Capital Territory) and 429 local governments, while 
the South has 17 states and 355 local government areas (Asadurian 2006: 421).  The constitution 
provides a detailed division of revenue collection and administration responsibilities to different 
levels of government.  The constitution also specifies which level of government has rights over 
these revenues.  Revenues are distributed on the basis of a principle of equality between sub-national 
units.  Such principle has increased the demand for the creation of states since this is a means for 
various underrepresented groups to access revenues derived from the exploitation of oil and gas.  At 
the same time, ethnic groups sought to have homogenous political units as a way of dealing with 
interethnic conflict.  Thus, the current system results in a disparity between regions and in allocative 
distortions (Asadurian 2006: 421).  As indicated in Table 2, multiple players are involved in the oil 
sector  (Table  2). 
 
Table 2: Major Oil Sector Players 
State level   President,    National  Assembly,  Governor,  State  House  of  Assembly,  Judiciary,  DPR,  EFCC, 
RMACF, National Planning Commission, NAPIMS, FIRS, NEITI.  
Local level   LG Chair, Local Council. 
Non-state  NGF, PENGASSAN, NUPENG, NLC, CSOs, Militant Youth, and CBOs (in oil communities). 
Mining 
companies 
NNPC, IOCs, Indigenous Operators. 
International 
players 
Bilateral and multilateral institutions. 
Traditional 
authorities 
Traditional councils, chiefs (of oil producing communities).   13 
a. Centralization of Rents and Regional Inequalities 
16.  Despite  the  long  history  of  local  governance,  political,  administrative,  and  fiscal 
decentralization in Nigeria still is moderate or low.  The office of the president has retained strong 
federal  powers,  with  limited  oversight  by  the  judiciary  and  national  legislature  (Ndegwa  2002).  
Arguably, the legislature has become more effective in the last few years in exercising oversight over 
budget  approval  and  implementation  as  well  as  political  appointments.  The  revenue  system  is 
characterized  by  high  centralization  and  state  and  local  government  areas  are  dependent  on 
intergovernmental transfers– statutory allocations in the Nigerian system.   
17.  Because of Nigeria‘s dependency on hydrocarbons, mining and petroleum taxes are the main 
source  of  governmental  revenue.    The  Federal  government  controls  the  administration  and 
collection of taxes levied from these activities.  It also collects most of the main taxes, regardless of 
whether or not states and local governments have the right to their revenues. States and LGAs have 
a high vertical imbalance since most of their income is collected by the federal tax agency and 
through the Federation Account.  The national government distributes federal allocations between 
states as follows:  40 percent divided equally among states, 30 percent proportionally to the state‘s 
population, 10 percent on the basis of land mass and terrain, 10 percent on social development 
factors, and 10 percent for internal revenue efforts.  Oil producing states receive 13 percent of oil 
revenues generated in their territory.  Local governments take 35% of the value of the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) Pool in addition to 20.6% of the Federation Account.  
18.  Nonetheless, several problems remain unaddressed, especially regarding the inconsistency 
between  resource  allocation  and  expenditure  assignment,  the  low  capacity  of  state  and  local 
governments, problems of coordination among different levels, elite capture, and cultural barriers to 
participation. As Adedokun (2004) points out, despite the clear demarcation of responsibilities and 
rights  established  by  the  Constitution,  states  and  local  governments  still  clash  over  sources  of 
internal revenue. The rich-oil states, particularly along the Niger River Delta, have increased their 
demand for a greater share of oil revenue. Local governments lack well trained staff and have little 
technical  capacity  to  collect  their  own  revenue.    The  problems  related  to  the  mobilization  of 
resources have negatively impacted the quality of public service provision and increased regional 
inequalities (Das Gupta 2003; Asadurian 2006). 
b. Low Political Inclusiveness 
19.  Patterns of political leadership recruitment explain how democratic mechanisms have largely 
been functioning. In spite of formal rules prescribed in the political parties‘ constitutions for open 
and  competitive  selection  of  candidates,  these  directives  are  commonly  ignored.  Although  the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is empowered to supervise party primaries, it 
is  unable  to  guarantee  free  and  fair  conduct  of  party  primaries  because  it  lacks  independence. 
Powerful local politicians, backed by security agencies, control the party primaries for candidate 
selection. Such powerful local politicians (popularly known as the ―godfathers‖) operate in alliance 
with national politicians to manipulate nomination processes. Through their influence on the INEC, 
favored candidates are ―returned‖ as winners. These results have necessitated several legal challenges 
to election outcome. The gubernatorial elections in Anambra, Edo, Ondo, Ekiti and Osun were 
reversed and victory restored to opposition candidates by the courts. The judiciary has not been   14 
entirely impartial in its judgments. In the Rivers State, the winner of the (Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) gubernatorial primary was replaced by the party before the elections. After the election, the 
Supreme Court pronounced that he was the rightful candidate and should replace the governor even 
though his name was not on the ballot. 
20.  According to independent observations, the outcomes of Nigerian elections are not true 
reflections of the voters‘ wishes. Because of distortions in the electoral process in the past and 
leaders  may  not  reflect  the  true  wishes  of  voters  the  former  tend  to    have  a  limited  sense  of 
obligation to the electorate. It is not surprising, therefore, that each successive election since 1993 
has been less fair than the one before it. The 1999 elections were considered acceptable because they 
marked the transition from military to civilian rule. The 2003 elections were more strongly criticized, 
but they were better conducted than the 2007 elections. All international observers described the 
conduct of the 2007 elections as unsatisfactory;
4 more than 1,700 petitions were filed against the 
declared results. However, the 2011 elections  have been hailed  by most observers as a marked 
improvement upon previous elections and relatively free and fair. 
21.  In  the  absence  of  sound  elections,  legislative  bodies  have  not  been  responsive  to  the 
electorate. Instead, members of legislative bodies have been subservient to the executives to ensure 
that they are reelected. Nonetheless, more than two-thirds of the national legislators in 2007 were 
not reelected because the ruling party punished them for not supporting the tenure elongation bid of 
President  Obasanjo.  In  addition,  as  Nigerian  legislators  want  to  keep  their  benefits,  which  are 
substantially higher than in alternative positions, they may not advocate welfare-enhancing policies if 
their  positions  could  be  threatened  in  the  process.  Such  vulnerability  contributes  to  a  political 
environment that is not conducive to the emergence of principled legislators who would promote 
public welfare. 
c. Rentier State Incentive Problems  
22.  The  development  challenges  in  Nigeria  are  complex.  Broad  consensus  in  the  literature 
suggests that they are closely related to the management of revenues from the petroleum sector (see, 
for example, Eifert et al. 2003; Sala-i-Martin 2003). The political environment has been described as 
one in which individual politicians rely on nondemocratic mechanisms to sustain their power and 
private agendas have been important drivers for political decisions. Prevailing patron-client politics 
may explain why welfare-enhancing political solutions have been eschewed if vested interests would 
be threatened. The power of the political elite has been enhanced through the party machinery, 
which has made it possible to control the selection of new candidates and their behavior. The 
impact  of  the  political  elite‘s  resource  control  and  allocation  of  revenues  on  core  democratic 
mechanisms is central to understanding the obstacles to development and governance failure. As 
Collier and Hoeffler (2008) explain, democracy will lead to growth in resource-rich economies only 
if checks and balances are substantially strengthened.  
23.  Challenges associated with the net export of nonrenewable natural resources—that is, ―the 
resource curse‖—can be explained in different ways. Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007) list a 
number  of  factors,  including  a  myopic  focus  on  cash  transfers  combined  with  weak  negotiating 
power in  regards to corporate  interests,  macroeconomic mismanagement (or the  Dutch  disease), 
volatility and inflation, insufficient investment in education, and patronage and spoliation. Although all   15 
of these factors are worthy of examination for the case of Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003), who analyzed the resource curse specifically as it applied to Nigeria, found that the country‘s 
poor development record is caused more by political economy difficulties than by macroeconomic 
factors.  The  incentive  problems  include  endemic  corruption  and  patronage,  which  are  growing 
worse as executive control has become less dependent on democratic support.
5  
24.  The federal government‘s responsibility for collection and redistribution of public revenues 
has  strengthened  its  political  relation  to  the  states  and  local  governments.  In  this  context,  the 
comparison between Nigeria and Angola in Heller (2007) provides some useful insights. Angola, 
through a clear centralization of power, has maximized revenues from the oil sector, but this goal 
has  been  elusive  in  Nigeria  because  ―politics  at  all  levels  are  extraordinarily  pluralistic  and 
competitive,  and  the  control  exercised  by  the  federal  executive  in  Abuja  is  limited,  as  state 
governors, legislators, private businessmen, and individual bureaucrats all eke individual advantage 
out  of  the  political  system.  This  results  in  systemic  inefficiencies  in  both  petroleum  revenue 
generation and expenditure, as uncoordinated self-interested actors lead corrupt transactions and 
block attempts at consolidated reform.‖ (Heller 2007) This points to important risks in Nigeria‘s 
petroleum governance with particular relevance to the revenue-generating aspect.  
25.  As political power increasingly became dependent on allocations of petroleum revenues and 
decisions in petroleum regulation, the social contract between politicians and the electorate became 
less  critical  for  political  control.
6  As  a  consequence,  the  electorate‘s  perception  of  political 
accountability faded. These outcomes confirm the rentier state postulation- that in a resource-rich 
and  dependent  country  revenue  control  could  become  the  core  source  of  political  power—a 
challenge Nigeria has in common with several other petroleum-rich developing countries (see Ross 
2001; Yates 1996). 
26.  Political power bolstered by petroleum revenues at the federal level has had ramifications 
beyond the three tiers of governance. Considering important nonpolitical aspects, the causality in the 
development  challenges  sometimes  seem  unclear.    The  alternative  explanations  behind  weak 
development tend to point toward the political setup. For example, the institutional framework for 
petroleum  governance  has  not  been  made  strong  enough  to  prevent  conflict  of  interest.  In 
particular,  it  has  been  difficult  to  ensure  transparency and  control  over  production  figures  and 
revenues. Every institution along the extractive industries value chain that potentially could prevent 
fraud  is weak.  Although these  weaknesses allow for manipulation, it is  clear that the  necessary 
underlying conditions for what generally is perceived as best practice in petroleum governance are 
not in place. The responsibility is political.  
27.  As another example, one may predict that a developing country easily could be ―captured‖ 
by the private sector. Firms have been able to influence the legal and regulatory stipulations through 
financial  inducements.  With  stronger  executive  power,  however,  the  private  sector  also  became 
more  state  dependent.  Success  in  business  became  increasingly  dependent  on  partnership  with 
political forces. Private companies, the oil sector included, have had to adjust significantly to a 
sometimes unpredictable sector governance environment.  
28.  As  a  third  example,  political  power  could  be  questioned  based  on  allegations  that 
representatives of the military benefit from access to oil revenues. These representatives allegedly   16 
condone  or  are  involved  in  organized  petroleum  theft  (bunkering)  with  opportunities  to  gain 
substantially (see Gillies 2009; Huillery 2007; Onuoha 2008; Watts 2008). The entrenched interests 
of  the  long  periods  of  military  rule,  combined  with  the  military‘s  inability  to  curb  bunkering, 
demonstrate the military‘s continued influence on the government. Nevertheless, it is unlikely, that 
military  influence  on  the  government  alone  would  explain  the  comprehensive  and  systematic 
weaknesses in sector governance. None of these theories rejects the assumption of political incentive 
problems—those  developed  through  petroleum-financed  patronage—as  the  main  explanation 
behind the country‘s challenges in petroleum sector governance.  
d. Access to Oil Wealth through Politics  
29.  The Nigerian politics we observe in the 21st century have evolved directly from the struggle 
by various interest groups to get access to oil revenues The prize in Nigerian politics is control of 
the federal government, which has power to grant access to the oil wealth. In terms of political 
power,  positions  in  the  oil  ministry  and  NNPC  the  agencies  which  oversee  the  government‘s 
interests  in  the  sector  are  next  in  line,  and  then  followed  by  control  over  states  and  local 
governments. Horizontal checks and balances in oil politics have been hindered by executive control 
of  petroleum  resources,  formally  constrained  by the  constitution  and  informally  constrained  by 
political control over oil revenues.
7 How could the executive gain this much control?  
i.  Executive Control on the Sector 
30.  Since the 1970s when oil became prominent in the economy, the federal government has 
maintained a strong hold on oil and gas resources, passing many laws giving it exclusive rights to the 
deposits.
8 Among such laws are the Territorial Waters Act, Exclusive Economic Zone Act, Land 
Use Act, Oil Pipelines Act, Petroleum Act, Minerals and Mining Act, and National Inland 
Waterways Act. These laws are reinforced by some sections of the Constitution. While guaranteeing 
citizens  protection  from  compulsory  acquisition  of  their  property  by  government  without 
compensation, section 44(3) states:  
―Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all minerals, 
mineral oils and natural gas in . . . Nigeria . . . shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be 
managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.‖ 
The federal government‘s control over oil and gas resources was achieved when Nigeria was ruled 
by a military regime. This regime did not invest the revenues to create conditions for sustainable 
development—what Collier (2008, 45) calls a catastrophic failure of public policy. Instead, the oil 
and gas resources became instrument of politics. Successive regimes could buy political support 
through the award of oil blocks, crude oil lifting contracts, and licenses for imports of refined 
products. Oil has been used to promote Nigeria‘s foreign policy through concessionary sales and 
credit  arrangements  to  African  countries,  including  Ghana,  Kenya,  Namibia,  Niger,  and  South 
Africa.  
31.  The transfer of rights to the oil and gas resources to the federal government has had many 
consequences  for  politics  in  Nigeria.  In  particular,  the  federal  center  has  been  dominated  over 
prolonged periods by sectional military and civilian elites who shaped the institutions to cement their   17 
control. This control is expressed, for example, in changes in the revenue allocation formula, which 
progressively eroded the weight attached to derivation as a principle of revenue allocation. This 
control  also  affects  the  weight  of  other  factors,  such  as  population  and  landmass,  which 
disadvantage the Niger Delta. Such control also affects the distribution of revenues to states and 
local  governments,  all  of  which  affect  what  the  different  regions  receive  from  the  Federation 
Account. Oil is produced in only nine states, and the modifications of laws over the years gradually  
led to their economic and political marginalization and partly explains the conflict in the Niger 
Delta. 
ii.  Control of Appointments in Petroleum Management 
32.  Political power and access to petroleum revenues have been bolstered through control over 
appointments to positions in  petroleum management. In line with the  patronage-based  political 
power, appointments into the petroleum ministry and NNPC are highly coveted. Appointments are 
closely monitored politically to see which ethnic group is gaining ascendancy and at whose expense.
9 
The sensitivity of appointments into the top echelons of the NNPC was highlighted in July 2009 
when the government announced dismissal of the corporation‘s top management staff and their 
replacements. Of the 13 people dismissed, 11 were southerners, and only 2 were northerners. Of the 
11 new heads of departments announced in the reorganization, 7 were northerners and 4 were 
southerners. Perceived lopsidedness of the top management appointments at the corporation has 
been  corrected  and made  more  ethnically plural.  This generated  many adverse  comments from 
southerners, especially those from the Niger Delta. In this context, the Nigerian constitution has 
provisions  for  the  reflection  of  the  ―federal  character‖  of  the  country  in  all  public  sector 
appointments, which essentially means balancing the different ethnicities and regions as much as 
possible. 
iii.  Corruption  
33.  From inception, oil production in Nigeria has been associated with a widening of the income 
gap as well as increasing poverty and corruption of state institutions. Weak control on petroleum 
governance made corruption possible (see Gillies 2008 for a review). Rent-seeking in regulation and 
at  political  levels  could  continue  for  decades.  According  to  international  rankings,  Nigeria‘s 
corruption level is perceived to be among the highest in the world. It constantly was ranked among 
the bottom three of Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from 1999-
2005, after which its ranking began to improve. Particularly the 2010 CPI report indicates that 
Nigeria was ranked 134 of the total 178 countries (Transparency International 2010).  Perceived 
improvements  are  the  result  of  strenuous  efforts  by  the  Economic  and  Financial  Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) to arrest and prosecute those guilty of advance fee fraud, money laundering, 
bribery, and other financial crimes. The EFCC has strategically targeted high-profile political office 
holders,  especially  state  governors,  who  frequently  were  accused  of  money  laundering  by  the 
President and Minister of Finance. The former governors of Bayelsa and Plateau were impeached 
following  the  EFCC‘s  charges  of  money  laundering,  although  the  methods  by  which  this 
impeachment was accomplished fell short of strict constitutional and legal stipulations.  
34.  Following the government‘s removal of the EFCC chair, Nuhu Ribadu, in December 2007, 
the anticorruption fight appears to have weakened. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton alluded to   18 
this on her visit to Nigeria on August 12, 2009, when she remarked that the U.S. government wants 
―to see the reinstatement of a vigorous corruption commission‖ and that ―the EFCC, which was 
doing well, has kind of fallen off in the last one year‖ (see The Nation 2009, 1–2).  The EFCC has, 
however, countered by releasing a list of 56 people who allegedly stolen  N243 billion (US$1.62 
billion) in the last five years.
10  Of the 33 high-profile cases pending in courts, only 11 were handled 
by Nuhu Ribadu, whereas the remaining 22 were instituted by Farida Waziri, the current EFCC 
chair.
11  
35.  The anticorruption agenda shows some signs of progress, but other evidence suggests that 
more could be done. For example, of 11 former governors accused of embezzling a total of N55.513 
billion (US$370 million), 10 are out on bail, while their cases are stalled by delaying tactics of their 
counsels. The only person convicted thus far (of stealing N4.4 billion or about US$30 million) was 
fined N3 million (US$20,000), which the EFCC has appealed. Furthermore, while Halliburton and 
Siemens officials in the United States and Germany, respectively, have been convicted for bribes 
given to Nigerian officials, those involved in Nigeria are yet to be identified and prosecuted.  
e. Access to Oil Wealth through Nonpolitical Channels: Bunkering  
36.  Although oil revenues might be lost in corruption, they disappear in other ways, too. This is 
relevant to understand continued governance failure because those who benefit from revenues will 
be less likely to demand changes in politics. Bunkering is a major source of oil revenue losses, and 
the activity is linked to militants in the Niger Delta. The term refers to various forms of oil theft 
from pipelines or export terminals. Because of the nature of the bunkering activities, precise figures 
are hard to obtain. A speech delivered by Petroleum Minister Odein Ajumogobia on behalf of 
President Yar‘Adua in mid-2007 put oil revenue losses through vandalization of oil and gas pipelines 
at about N8 billion (about US$6.7 million) daily and crude oil losses at as much as 625,000 barrels of 
crude daily, more than 25 percent of Nigeria‘s OPEC export quota.
12  By mid-2009, nearly half of 
Nigeria‘s OPEC quota of 2.2 million barrels of crude per day could not be produced for export. It 
was either lost to shut-ins, spilled or stolen. Other estimates vary. Cole (2008), for example, has 
estimated that Nigeria loses between $4 billion and $18 billion annually to illegal bunkering alone 
(see Financial Times 2008). Davis (2009) assesses that as much as 800 thousand barrels a day were lost 
through bunkering or production shut-ins in 2008, which were equivalent to $34 billion dollars (See 
Figures 5-6).  This author explains that commodity prices and violence are highly interlinked in the 
context of the Niger Delta.  As prices rise, both violence and bunkering aggravate.   Moreover, 
increasing  bunkering  and  oil  sabotage  actually  represents  a  serious  threat  to  national  and 
environmental  security  in  Nigeria  (Onuoha  2008).  In  2010,  many  onshore  operations  remained 
suspended in the western Niger River Delta.   19 
Figure  5:  Estimated  Volume  of  Stolen  and 
Assumed Production in Shut-in (2003-2008) 
Figure  6:  Value  of  Stolen  and  Lost 
Production (2003-2008) 
   
Sources: Davis 2009  Sources: Davis 2009 
i.  Small-Scale Petroleum Theft versus Organized Crime  
37.  Losses occur in different ways and volumes. Small-time operators who tap into oil pipelines 
are not confined to the Niger Delta. They are spread all over the country where the pipelines pass. 
Criminals trying to steal refined petroleum products for distribution through informal retail outlets 
have  caused  periodic  pipeline  accidents  in  Lagos  and  other  areas  outside  the  Niger  Delta.
13 
Numerous  small-scale  crude  oil  thieves  also  steal  the  oil  for  refining  in  illegal  local  refineries. 
Between  June  and  July  of  2008,  the  military  Joint  Task  Force  (JTF)  had  destroyed  111  illegal 
refineries that were located ―in almost every village in Bomadi and Burutu Local Government areas‖ 
(This Day 2008, 1).  
38.  Although bunkering is a large problem for the government, those involved seem to defend 
the crime by reference to low political accountability. Asari Dokubo, leader of a militant gang in 
Rivers State, is alleged to steal crude from Shell pipelines for refining locally and for sale to barges 
and ocean tankers. He claims that ―the oil belongs to us, we‘re not stealing it. It is the Nigerian state 
stealing our oil from us‖ (IRIN 2008, 1). Neverheless, the resource control conflict also provided 
opportunistic excuse for militants and criminal gangs to engage in oil theft, the proceeds of which 
they used to procure arms to perpetuate themselves and resist the security agencies. 
39.  Those engaged in large-scale oil theft break into pipelines in the Delta‘s mangrove swamps. 
They load stolen oil into smaller barges and ships that then go on the high seas to load huge ocean 
tankers.  Another form of large-scale bunkering is the loading of crude in excess of approved or 
rightful quotas by licensed operators (Azaiki 2006, 268). Given the highly visible nature of oil theft, 
it would appear that there must be either payoffs to or participation of security forces.  
40.  As the bunkering gets large and organized, it has a clear demand side. Large-scale stealing of 
oil by large ocean tankers involves international organized crime groups, which buy the oil and take 
them to refineries abroad for refining. The payoff from this type of bunkering must be exceedingly 
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Navy announced that it had seized 260 vessels used for illegal bunkering (Leadership (Abuja) 2007). 
On July 11, 2008, the JTF arrested a tanker (MT Lina Panama) owned by a Greek company called 
Corinthians laden with 150 metric tons of Nigerian crude oil suspected to be stolen from a Nigerian 
Agip  Oil  Company‘s  facility.  The  federal  government  has  blamed  noncooperation  of  the 
international community and lack of capability of Nigeria security operatives for the persistence of 
large-scale  bunkering.  The  Minister  of  State  for  Petroleum  Resources,  Odein  Ajumogobia,  told 
newsmen in Abuja on July 26, 2009, that satellite images prove collusion of an international criminal 
cartel and that Nigerian security ought to be able to stop the small barges that feed the ocean tankers 
on the high sea (This Day 2009, 10). 
41.  Indeed, as bunkering has persisted and grown profusely over the years, many Nigerians 
believe that the security agencies, especially the Navy, may be aiding and abetting illegal bunkering 
(Gillies 2009; Huillery 2007). According to a former presidential aspirant and presidential adviser, a 
posting to the Niger Delta is highly coveted by the troops who see it as an opportunity to become 
enriched through escorting stolen products.
14  
42.  In 2003, the issue of informal excess lifting of crude oil at export terminals was brought 
before the National Assembly when the chair of the House Committee on Petroleum claimed that 
the country was losing about N100 billion annually from such activities by the  international oil 
companies  (IOCs)  (Azaiki  op.  cit,  267).  These  losses  pose  significant  risk,  particularly  given 
weaknesses in  the  system of checks and balances in  the  various institutions monitoring the  oil 
industry, including security.  
ii.  Government Response: From Tolerance to Incapacity?  
43.  The government falters to deal decisively with the extensive bunkering probably due to the 
payoffs from the bunkering, which are spread quite broadly among entrenched interests in the oil 
communities (see Onuoha 2008; Watts 2008). The prevailing violence in the region also constrains 
military action. The violence is perpetrated in small communities where people are forced to join 
criminal  gangs  for  sheer  survival,  acquiesce  to  illegal  bunkering  for  self-protection,  or  flee  the 
communities for safety. Security operatives explain that the government is restrained from acting 
against the different forms of illegal bunkering because of the potentially high secondary damages, 
especially loss of innocent lives. Not even those in positions of authority at the local level can escape 
the intimidation and violence used by those engaged in illegal bunkering. Traditional rulers and even 
local government chairs are pressured to succumb to the prevailing order. If these officials fail to 
acquiesce, bunkerers can incite rebellion in the community or attempt to assassinate them.  
44.  For example, Futek Zikoregha,  Chair of Forcados local government, one of the oil-rich 
communities  of  the  Delta  State,  was  forced  into  hiding  after  bunkerers  incited  the  community 
against  him.  His  story  reflects  the  enormous  risk  individuals  face  when  motivated  to  challenge 
powerful criminal gangs engaged in oil theft. Zikoregha had granted an interview to The Nation in 
which he denounced bunkerers in his Local Government Area and warned that he would disclose 
their identities. The kingpin of the bunkerers bribed the community to remove him from office. He 
started receiving death threats and feared that he was being trailed. He had no confidence that the 
state could protect him and he went into hiding by May 2009. In his words, ―the soldiers and the   21 
community leaders are involved; in fact, it is they that are the masterminds of these things‖ (The 
Nation 2008, A13). He points specifically at soldiers‘ involvement in bunkering near River Ramos.  
f. Niger Delta Conflict 
45.  The Nigerian population has reacted against what is widely perceived as governance failure 
in both nonviolent and violent ways. Citizens have demonstrated and gone on strike, academics have 
published  harsh  criticisms  for  decades,  nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs)  have  awakened 
locally and internationally, and the media has debated oil politics. The international press has given 
significant media attention to Niger Delta violence.  
46.  Conflict follows from poor governance not only nationally but also in the states and local 
governments of the Niger Delta region. The people of the Niger Delta face severe environmental 
degradation. In 1991, when the world average for gas flaring was 4 percent, Nigeria‘s rate was 76 
percent despite enactment of ambitious legislation to regulate gas flaring and venting.
15  Nigeria is 
the second biggest gas-flaring nation in the world after the Russian Federation. Its 23 billion cubic 
meters of flared gas represents about 13 percent of the worl d‘s  total  (Environmental  Rights 
Action/Friends  of  the  Earth  Nigeria,  2008).  Acid  rain  caused  by  gas  flaring  pollutes  the  air; 
contaminates water sources; destroys vegetation; and causes leukemia, asthma, and other respiratory 
diseases. It is estimated that gas flaring costs Nigeria $2.5 billion annually (Elaw Advocate 2006).Gas 
flaring and other oil-related pollutions have destroyed traditional livelihoods such as farming and 
fishing, the main occupations of the area‘s citizens (Ibeanu 2000).  
47.  The socio-economic situation in the major oil producing states in the Niger Delta region has 
long been dire with typically high unemployment rates, specifically 18, 28 and 39 percent in Rivers, 
Delta, and Bayelsa respectively (World Bank, 2011a).
16  In reaction to extreme poverty, high levels of 
youth employment,  environmental degradation, poor service delivery, lack of accountability   of 
governments and officials, and rigged elections, which prevent nonviolent change of leadership, 
violent uprisings among the youth have  come as no surprise.
17 The violent conflicts in the region 
have been the result of perceived material deprivation, demand for more control over oil resources 
and psychological frustrations borne out of helplessness within the oil communities.
18   
48.  Despite massive military operations against the Niger Delta militants in June–September 
2009, it became obvious that the challenge could not be solved through the use of force. Opposition 
against the government is deep-rooted in the communities that account for a significant share of the 
population. Widespread disaffection sustained continued violence, which paralyzed oil operations 
while military action was taken. In addition to this violence, oil is spatially concentrated in a terrain 
that is  difficult to control. The Niger Delta‘s mangrove swamps are water logged. The creeks and 
estuaries are not easy to navigate, and security arrangements are difficult to sustain. Oil and gas 
pipelines along thousands of kilometers on the soil‘s surface are exposed to easy looting. In the 
absence of effective surveillance, the pipelines are vulnerable to vandalization and bunkering. In 
turn, these resources are used to sustain insurgent groups.    22 
i.  Uprisings against the Government  
49.  The struggle against what the communities perceived as exploitation by the government 
started in the 1990s. Environmentalist and political activist Ken Saro-Wiwa internationalized the 
agitation for fairer distribution of oil wealth and environmental protection (PEFS 2004), when he led 
the Ogoni people to publish the ―Ogoni Bill of Rights.‖ According to Henry Okah, Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) leader, the uprisings against the oil sector governance 
started peacefully, while the ―resort to arms by indigenes of the Delta is borne out of the frustration 
and the heavy handedness of the Nigerian military and successive governments‖ (Next 2009, 2). 
Militant  youth  mobilized  their  communities  to  protest  against  inequities  in  the  distribution  of 
benefits of the oil industry.
19  The mobilization led to the 1998 Kaima Declaration, initiated by Ijaw 
youth activists in the Niger Delta, which unequivocally attributes the crisis of development and 
spiraling violence in the Niger Delta region against the policies of the Nigerian State and the IOCs.  
50.  The Kaima Declaration unionized communities against the government and the IOCs—
several ethnic groups in the region have been united under its banner to fight the deprivation of the 
region (Turton 1997). Among the demands in this declaration are the right to self-determination, 
abrogation of some laws, such as the Land Use Decree and the Petroleum Decree, which are seen as 
particularly  unjust, compensation for environmental degradation, withdrawal  of transnational oil 
companies from the Niger Delta until a better solution for host communities is implemented, and 
demilitarization of the Niger Delta, including the removal of military task forces. In many ways, this 
declaration  explains  the  political  foundation  of  the  violence  that  has  taken  place  over  the  last 
decade.
20 
51.  Violence in the Niger Delta has had a significant impact on oil production levels. In areas 
controlled by armed gangs—many of them part of MEND—government officials were driven off 
creeks where the pipelines pass, farm tanks, and export terminals, which enabled even licensed 
operators  to  lift  crude  unrecorded  (see  Hanson  2007).  Violent  acts,  either  directly  targeting  oil 
installations or indirectly affecting operations by making production too dangerous given incidents 
of inter- or intracommunal violence close to oil installations, cause some wells to be shut-in. These 
shut-ins lasted from just a few days to long periods of time. Shell, for example, has not been able to 
produce oil in Ogoniland since the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. For oil companies that recruit a 
majority  of  their  workforce  locally,  it  also  has  been  a  challenge  that  some  of  their  employees 
sympathize with the militant groups.  
52.  The Niger Delta thus has constructed a radical identity in its struggle against marginalization 
in the Nigerian federal system and for resource control. It has enhanced group solidarity in its quest 
for a fair deal in Nigeria‘s distributive federal system. It has also emphasized the need as well as 
enhanced opportunities for reform. However, in the process, the Niger Delta has disturbed the 
hegemonic  alliance  among  major ethnic groups for control of  rents  from Nigeria‘s oil  and gas 
industry, as well as its ability to control its share of the rents. At the same time, Niger Delta uprisings 
have led to spiraling violence that is beyond the control of the state and local authorities. This is 
partly because defense and security are federal responsibilities and the federal government controls 
the police and the army.   23 
53.  The government‘s response to varied demands from the Niger Delta groupings has included 
a mixture of repression of protest activities and, more recently, reconciliation policies. Many reports 
have documented incidents of brutal repression of protesters against oil companies in the Niger 
Delta  (HRW  1995,  1999,  2003;  International  Crisis  Group  2006).  The  police,  Special  Security 
Forces, and the JTF are accused of violent acts, including shooting protesters, mass attacks of cities 
and villages, arson, and rape. Intended to deter further protests by the people of the oil-producing 
communities,  such  severe  repression  has  escalated  violence  with  militant  youth  seeking  arms, 
attacking oil installations and facilities, and kidnapping IOC staff.  
ii.   A Complex Relationship between Local Politicians and Militant Groupings  
54.  Militant  groupings  may  have  built  on  unfair  petroleum  sector  governance  and  few 
employment  opportunities.  For  example,  armed  gangs  were  raised  and  nurtured  for  electoral 
purposes. Human Rights Watch indicated that the emergence of armed gangs in the Rivers State was 
directly linked to the return to pluralistic politics since 1999 when rival politicians armed idle youth 
to generate support by force.
21  
55.  The armed gangs that perpetrated electoral malpractices turned to bunkering on a small scale 
after the elections, and thus, their opposition‘s political character may have been watered down by 
the more rewarding looting, which was defended by references to unjust petroleum governance. 
Their numbers grew rapidly as a result of the high profits derived from bunkering, as several gangs 
emerged to share the profits. Intra-community violence increased when IOCs made direct payments 
to some communities to calm uprisings. The state‘s intervention to quell the violence was ineffective 
because of inadequate security personnel and equipment, giving the impression that the government 
was condoning the violence.  
iii.  Alternative Strategy to Peace in the Niger Delta: From Repression toward Compromise  
56.  The government has sought alternative solutions to the violence and uprisings in the Niger 
Delta through repressions, transfers of revenues, and political compromise. The results have been 
mixed  at  best.  When  it  comes  to  transfers  of  revenues,  the  federal  government  has  tried  to 
administer development funds directly to the regions. The recent profound macro and fiscal reform 
initiatives at the federal level have not been matched by commensurate reforms at the state level. 
Lagging reforms and misaligned political incentives contribute to the dismal failure of Niger Delta 
state governments to translate their revenues into services for people. In 2005, the four main oil-
producing Delta states (Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Akwa Ibom) jointly received approximately 90 
percent of all derivation oil payments (about N265 billion or US$2 billion equivalent), but they 
continued  to  perform  poorly  in  service  delivery  according  to  human  development  indicators 
(Freinkman 2007).  
57.  Although the government claimed  improvements in livelihoods in the region, the actual 
impact has been limited because of administrative weaknesses and the limited accountability to local 
communities of such programs. Examples include the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992 and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
in 2000. OMPADEC failed because it ―was run like another government corporation, appointed by 
and accountable to the federal centre only‖ (Oguine). Corruption was rampant in the management   24 
of  OMPADEC‘s  funds.  Contracts  were  overinflated  or  not  executed  after  upfront  payment  of 
mobilization money, which ranged between 30 and 70 percent. 
58.  With a mandate to design and implement a master plan for the physical development of the 
Niger Delta region and ensure that petroleum-funded projects are not misused, the establishment of 
the NDDC was a step in the right direction. The commission would derive its funds from three 
main  sources:  the  federal  government,  oil-producing  and  gas-processing  companies;  and  an 
ecological fund. In reality, however, the NDDC has not been fully funded as intended, and thus it 
does not have the resources to fulfill its mandate.
22 There are allegations that corruption is also a 
problem within NDDC.  
59.  As another example, the president initiated a rapid intervention in April 2006 by launching a 
50-member Consolidated Council on Social and Economic Development of Coastal States of the 
Niger Delta, which included all the governors of the affected states. Part of the council‘s short-term 
program was job creation for the youth of the Niger Delta. It was envisaged that 20,000 new jobs 
would be created for citizens of the Niger Delta in the armed forces, police, and NNPC. To provide 
opportunities for technical skills acquisition for area youth, plans called for the Petroleum Training 
Institute to be upgraded and a polytechnic facility to be built in Bayelsa state. The program also 
outlined  infrastructure  projects  that  would  be  implemented  in  the  short  and  medium  term  to 
enhance economic activities in the region. Because of the 2007 electoral campaigns and regional 
violence, however, not much was achieved before the change in the federal executive office.  
60.  Repeated failure of the government‘s community development efforts as a solution to the 
Niger Delta challenge increased tension. In an interview conducted by Nicholas Shaxon with Alhaji 
Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, a commander of one of the militant groups in the Delta area, he confirmed 
the challenge and claimed that ―[o]il companies and the Government have tried one ‗community 
development‘ after another, yet the anger just keeps rising. . . . Dialogue will lead us nowhere‖ 
(Shaxon 2007, 192–94).  
61.  In July 2009, the government announced an amnesty to militants in the Niger Delta effective 
from August 6, 2009, for 60 days, and most militant leaders embraced the offer. At the end of the 60 
days, 15,000 militants had surrendered their weapons and registered at camps established for the 
purpose. The post-amnesty program for the militants included a monthly payment of N65,000 as 
well as encampment and training for vocational and technical skills needed to participate in the oil 
industry. In addition, the NDDC announced a Nigerian Technical Aid Corps (NTAC) scheme for 
unemployed  graduates  in  the  Niger  Delta,  which  guaranteed  each  participant  N45,000  for  a 
maximum of two years. To address the development challenges of the region, the government also 
announced massive infrastructure contracts for the Niger Delta area. It appears the government‘s 
post-amnesty  program  has  underestimated  the  numbers  of  militants  and  it  has  not  adequately 
responded to the demands for rehabilitation and reintegration. The infrastructure development has 
lagged behind because of the delay in starting projects. The amnesty program was revitalized by 
President Goodluck Jonathan.  
62.  The  amnesty  program,  however,  also  has  critics.  Henry  Okah,  putative  MEND  leader, 
insisted  that  the  demands  of  the  group  ―must  be  brought  before  the  National  Assembly  for 
consideration‖ before the amnesty could work (Next 2009, 3). In the months that followed, there   25 
were positive developments, including several ceremonies of militants laying down their weapons. 
By January 2010, however, the outcome of the amnesty initiative appeared uncertain and it was 
unclear how well the government would keep its part of the promises. A significant number of 
Niger Delta representatives remained in detention, and the Ijaw Council for Human Rights claimed 
that 80 percent of the estimated cost for the amnesty program went to consultants and contractors, 
leaving ex-militants with just 20 percent for support and employment. The many initiatives from the 
government  that  seemed  to  fail  (including  the  Niger  Delta  Development  Board,  OMPADEC, 
NDDC,  and  Niger  Delta  Summit)  have  almost  eliminated  all  trust  in  the  government.  Critics 
describe the  amnesty  program  as a one-sided intention  to  secure  oil  operations with minimum 
solutions for the communities. In early February 2010, MEND fractions declared that they had been 
disillusioned  by  the  government‘s  amnesty  initiative  and  would  resume  hostile  attacks  on  oil 
installations. They made good the threat as bombs went off to disrupt the national independence 
anniversary celebrations in October 2010 in Abuja. The peace remains fragile and violence will erupt 
if the government‘s promises again are not kept. 
III.  Natural Resource Management 
63.  The  previous  section  identified  political  economy  vulnerabilities  that  negatively  impact 
natural resource management at different stages of the extractive industry value chain. Nigeria does 
not develop from as much of its revenues as it could. Numerous studies have pointed to deep-
rooted corruption and misuse of power to the exclusive benefits of some groups at the cost of 
society at large. Governance challenges are difficult to identify and analyze, however. They require 
insights into complex power alliances, which cut across formal structures, hierarchies, or sectors. 
This study has not sought evidence against any group or individual, but rather has considered how 
incentive problems in petroleum sector governance are reflected in the government‘s choices and 
responses to petroleum-related challenges.  
64.  Many of the development challenges in Nigeria are the results of past policy choices in the 
evolution of petroleum governance. The comprehensive reform of the petroleum sector proposed 
by the government is an effort to move out of an adverse equilibrium. The likelihood of success may 
depend critically on the following four petroleum-related mechanisms discussed: (i) how access to 
oil revenues may have affected politics and core democratic functions; (ii) how the political elite has 
gained access to oil wealth through  politics;  (iii) how  groups other than the  political elite  have 
claimed access to oil wealth; and (iv) how the reactions from those without access to oil revenues 
have been held largely ineffective. These mechanisms interact and appear to explain why it has been 
difficult to implement best practices in petroleum sector governance and make the Nigerian society 
benefit more fairly from oil revenues.    26 
Extracting Resource Wealth 
a.  Award of Contracts and Licenses 
65.  The process of licensing is an important factor in sector governance. Before the Obasanjo 
administration (1999-2007) introduced an open competitive bidding system in 2000, the head of 
state or minister awarded oil blocks on a discretionary basis. Block fees were usually negotiated. It 
was normal for the winners of oil blocks to be charged less than its value and to resell at a margin. 
The 2000 round was significant only for the introduction of a new policy on marginal fields. The 
marginal fields were reclaimed from the IOCs, which had neglected to develop them because they 
were considered uneconomic. After a prolonged evaluation process, in February 2003, 24 marginal 
fields were awarded to 31 Nigerian companies (Ariweriokuma 2009), five of which belonged to state 
governments (Vines et al. 2009). 
66.  In  2005,  the  government  organized  an  auction  designed  in  line  with  international  best 
practice (Olsen 2005). The government invited Brazil, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States  to  observe  the  licensing  round  and  introduced  the  local  content  vehicle  (LCV).  It  was 
mandatory for each award winner to select one Nigerian partner as the LCV, which would have a 10 
percent interest to increase local participation in the oil sector. The goal was to make the IOC 
(operator) train the LCVs and thereby transfer technology that would make local oil companies 
capable of competing in the industry.  
67.  However, the auction did not proceed as smoothly as intended (Olsen 2005). Among the 
flaws were tardy release of new production-sharing agreements (PSAs) and rules on how to select 
the LCV. The government also reserved choice oil blocks for some Asian governments (China; 
India; Taiwan, China; and the Republic of Korea) with which it had negotiated oil-for-infrastructure 
deals. Preferential conditions for Asian oil companies and forcible selection of LCVs lead to the 
withdrawal  of  many  established  IOCs,  which  effectively  boycotted  the  bidding  process. 
Subsequently, the 2006 mini-round and the 2007 round also provided preferential treatment of the 
Asian companies willing to commit to infrastructure investments.  
68.  In 2008, following protests by losers in the bidding process, President Yar‘Adua set up a 
probe into how the 2007 bidding was conducted. After the president received an interim report, the 
investigation was extended to cover the 2005 and 2006 rounds. The House of Representatives also 
tasked an ad hoc committee to investigate the matter. During the public hearings conducted by the 
committee,  it  came  to  light  that  despite  the  government‘s  commitment  to  openness  and 
transparency, some oil blocks were awarded on a discretionary basis. The rights of first refusal that 
were granted to some firms in return for their investment in infrastructures were too advantageous. 
Moreover, some of the companies that benefited from the grant of first right of refusal did not 
deliver on the infrastructure investments. Irregularities also were documented in the payment of 
signature bonuses and other fees. Following these revelations, the president attempted to cancel the 
awards to those companies. 
69.  The case of the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) is interesting in this context, 
although the case is subject to multiple interpretations. In 2005, KNOC was awarded two offshore 
deep-water oil blocks. The Nigerian government had negotiated with the Korean government to   27 
grant KNOC the right of first refusal on these two oil blocks in return for a 745-mile gas pipeline 
from the Niger Delta to Abuja, construction of a railway line from Port Harcourt to Maiduguri, and 
2,250 megawatts of power generation. It was later revealed that only $9 million out of the $240 
million signature bonuses had been paid and that no progress was made in the construction of the 
infrastructure. President Yar‘Adua annulled the award of the two oil blocks. KNOC went to a 
Federal High Court in Abuja to challenge the revocation on the grounds that it had applied for 
delayed payment of the balance of the signature bonus and that the president lacked the authority to 
cancel  its  licenses.  The  court  found  in  KNOC‘s  favor  on  August  20,  2009,  declaring  that  the 
Petroleum Act vested the power to revoke oil block licenses in the minister of petroleum and not 
the president. KNOC‘s lawyer, Robert Clarke, said the implication of the judgment ―is that the 
international community will now have confidence to invest in Nigeria‖ (The Guardian 2009, 72).  
The government appealed this judgment. By December 2009, the case was adjourned for out-of-
court settlement, as diplomatic efforts were ongoing to resolve the dispute amicably. 
70.  The  governments‘  objectives  to  diversify  the  IOCs  and  promote  competition  of  local 
companies have often been difficult to reconcile.  The discretionary award to Nigerian companies 
aimed to promote local entrepreneurship in the oil and gas industry has thus far undermined the 
competitiveness and transparency of the  bidding process.  The bidding process attracted  a large 
number of indigenous applicants seeking opportunities for arbitrage. Yet some of those independent 
companies that received blocks have been unable to fund exploration  or find  foreign  technical 
partners to explore on a sole-risk basis. Thus, attempts at reforming the licensing process had mixed 
results in terms of instituting openness and transparency and of promoting Nigerian participation. 
b.  Regulation and Monitoring of Operations23 
71.  At  inception,  Nigeria  had  minimal  government  regulation  of  the  oil  industry  in  Nigeria 
(Nwokeji  2000).  IOCs  operated  the  concessions  and  paid  appropriate  taxes,  and  oversight  was 
vested in a one-man unit in the Mines Division of the Ministry of Lagos Affairs, later part of the 
Ministry of Mines and Power (MMP). To increase control over the industry, the government passed 
the  Petroleum  Act  in  1969,  which  stipulated  that  only  companies  registered  in  Nigeria  could 
participate in the oil industry and reserved the right of the government to acquire shareholding in all 
new concessionary contracts (Omoregbe 2001).  
72.  Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, the 
same year the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was established. A law was passed that 
required Nigerian ownership of at least 60 percent of equity stake in all foreign businesses, and the 
national oil company would manage the ownership share. The Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) was established to regulate the industry. 
73.  The development in Nigeria toward more state control corresponded to policy choices in 
many other petroleum-rich countries at that time. In Nigeria, however, the performance of the state-
owned oil company (NNOC) and the regulator (DPR) were hampered by political interference, in 
particular by the MPP, the then-supervising ministry (Turner 1978; Nwokeji 2007). In 1979, the 
government transformed the NNOC into the powerful NNPC.    28 
74.  The DPR is supposed to be an independent regulator, but it has not been able to play this 
role in practice. Its mandate includes supervising all petroleum industry operations in the country; 
enforcing environmental and safety regulations; keeping accurate records on operations (reserves, 
production,  and  exports  of  products);  processing  applications  for  licenses,  ensuring  timely  and 
adequate payments of all rents and royalties; and monitoring the local content policy. In reality, DPR 
has been treated just like another arm of the NNPC subject to its directives, those of the Ministry, 
and the presidency. It also is hampered by human and financial capacity constraints. As a result, 
DPR often fails to perform its functions effectively.  
75.  The  National  Petroleum  Investment  Management  Services  (NAPIMS),  a  subsidiary  of 
NNPC, also plays a major role in oil sector governance. NAPIMS is responsible for monitoring and 
rationalizing the budgets of JVs, promoting Nigerian content, and ensuring that all partners in Joint 
Ventures (JVs), Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), and (Service Contracts (SCs) comply with 
their  contract  terms.  NAPIMS  processes  JV  contracts  for  approval  by  the  NNPC  and  the 
government. In this role, like the DPR, the subsidiary is subject to pressures from the IOCs, NNPC, 
government officials, and politicians chasing contracts. 
Taxing Resource Wealth 
a.  Collection of Taxes and Royalties 
76.  Nigeria remains highly dependent on petroleum revenues (Okauru 2008, 8). These revenues 
are composed of crude oil sales receipts, petroleum profits tax (PPT), royalty, upstream gas sales, 
Nigeria liquefied natural gas, flared gas and pipeline fines, domestic crude, and signature bonuses. 
Revenue from crude oil sales and PPT and royalties are the most important sources of revenue, 
contributing to almost 42 percent and 40 percent of total revenues in 2005, respectively.
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77.  Three key institutions are involved in oil revenue collection, specifically the NNPC, Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), and the DPR. The NNPC receives and markets government‘s share 
of crude production from IOCs, which amounts to nearly 60 percent of the crude produced in the 
country. It also receives allocations for the declining local refineries, most of which it also sells. The 
NNPC allocates lifting contracts, which, as NEITI audit reports have shown, do not always follow 
advertised  criteria  or  guarantee  competitive  pricing.  The  NNPC‘s  handling  of  crude  sales  and 
remittances of proceeds have pitched it against the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal 
Commission  (RMAFC),  which  monitors  accruals  into  the  Consolidated  Revenue  Fund  (CRF). 
RMAFC  alleges  that  NNPC  does  not  remit  all  revenues,  an  accusation  supported  by  relevant 
national legislative committees. 
78.  FIRS  is  responsible  for  collecting  petroleum  profits  tax  from  oil  companies;  DPR  is 
responsible for royalties, gas flare penalties, rents, and other levies; and NNPC is responsible for 
revenue  from  crude  oil  sales.  These  institutions,  however,  demonstrate  a  persistent  lack  of 
coordination. According to the  NEITI audits,  collaboration between  physical  measurement and 
financial assessment is weak.   29 
79.  The  practices  for  handling  signature  bonuses  from  the  2005  bid  round  are  seen  as 
nontransparent. Receipt of all signature bonuses could not be confirmed. The practices for record 
keeping by the DPR are ineffective. PPT payments by oil companies are based on unregulated self-
assessment that is largely accepted by FIRS without validation. To be more effective, FIRS requires 
significant capacity building. Traditionally, a major challenge has been that the NNPC has not been 
forthcoming with the information it holds. It is known to be opaque and nontransparent and efforts 
to force it to follow a disclosure regime have not succeeded. FIRS suffers greatly because of this.  
80.  The  ―revolving  door‖  phenomenon—in  which  most  Nigerian  oil  sector  regulators    are 
senior executives in the industry or are seconded to work in the regulatory agencies while on leave 
from  their  IOCs—further  weakens  the  integrity  of  regulation  and  tax  administration.  These 
executives, therefore, are more loyal to the operators than to the state.  
i.  Fiscal Regime 
81.  The downstream industries in Nigeria are subject to the normal Companies Income Tax Act 
(CITA), and the upstream industries in Nigeria are subject to the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA) 
of 2004, which applies exclusively to the oil sector. Upstream companies also are subject to royalty, 
signature, and production bonuses.  
82.  The oil producers pay royalties on the value of oil extracted. The rates of royalty vary by the 
nature of contractual arrangement (PSC or JV), the type of drilling (onshore or offshore), and the 
depth at which oil is available. They range from 0 percent (for PSCs operating offshore at the depth 
greater than 1,000 meters) to 20 percent (for onshore drilling).
25 Both the PSCs and JVs are subject 
to the Petroleum Profits Tax .
26 This tax is applied on profits minus expenses and allowable 
deductions (interest and royalty payments, depreciation of capital, and so on). The statutory tax rate 
is 85 percent, which is quite high. Special tax rates, however, apply to new companies and PSCs. For 
JVs, a series of incentives also are available.
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83.  Thus, while the law provides for a high tax rate, this rate is combined with a series of 
concessions and incentives depending on the nature of contract and the stage of production. To 
complicate  matters,  most  oil  companies  have  entered  into  a  stabilization  agreement  with  the 
government lasting for 15 to 30 years, thus making them immune from any subsequent changes in 
the tax law. As a result of these special provisions, the fiscal regime has become quite intricate. A 
comparison of Nigeria‘s fiscal regime with its Africa peers (for example, Angola, Cameroon, Cote 
d‘Ivoire,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  Equatorial  Guinea,  and  Gabon)  and  international 
practices among oil-producing countries also bear testimony to the complexity of Nigeria‘s tax laws.   
84.  The existing tax regime in Nigeria thus suffers from several overlaps and contradictions that 
need to be addressed. Some of the provisions have become inconsistent and, in some cases, even 
contradictory to one another as may be seen from the following: 
-  The present tax regime has especially high statutory tax rates going up to 85 percent. 
-  The rate for PSCs at the same time is reduced to 50 percent.    30 
-  Generous tax credit and tax allowances are permitted. 
-  The  MOUs,  which  specify  the  fiscal  conditions  for  oil  operators,  often  provide 
numerous fiscal incentives and protect operators‘ profits at the government‘s expense 
when oil prices go down.  
-  At the same time, a minimum tax liability of 15 percent is mandated in the law. 
-  The royalty rates are neither linked to price of oil nor to the rate of return or profits. 
85.  Clearly,  a  comprehensive  tax  reform  is  needed  in  the  oil  sector.  The  pending  PIB  is 
supposed to replace the existing laws governing the petroleum sector. The bill aims to increase the 
government‘s take in JVs to 95 percent from its present level of 85–90 percent and its take in PSCs 
to about 70 percent from its current level of 60 percent. Although the law covers fiscal provisions, it 
does not include a reform of the tax system applied to the oil and gas sector.
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86.  Compared  with  its  peers  in  West  Africa  and  practices  in  other  oil-producing  countries, 
Nigeria‘s  royalty  and  profits  tax  rates  are  high,  but  at  the  same  time,  Nigeria  gives  substantial 
incentives  and  allowances.  For  example,  it  makes  the  fiscal  regime  competitive  by  giving  a  50 
percent tax allowance, and it provides for a sliding scale of royalty, depending on water depth and 
differences in production costs. The absence of cost-recovery limits ensures that investors recover 
their investments in good time. Additionally, MOUs include other incentives for the companies and 
further reduce the tax liability. 
ii.  Revenue Administration  
87.  Numerous  shortcomings  in  revenue  administration  have  been  identified  in  the  Nigeria 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) financial audit report 1999–2004 issued in 
2006. The very quantity of oil that is the basis of all royalty and profits tax assessment is uncertain. 
Department of Petroleum Regulation (DPR) production data often differ from the data provided by 
the companies. Measurement of crude oil is also a problem.  
-  The DPR does not have a comprehensive database of those who hold oil mining leases 
and oil prospecting licenses.  
-  DPR has not rigorously verified royalty computations prepared by companies and the 
key related variables in computation—volume and API (American Petroleum Institute- 
measuring  density  of  petroleum  liquid)  gravity—seem  to  be  interpreted  and  applied 
subjectively by the companies.  
-  In  the  present  setup,  the  responsibility  for  technical  data  dealing  with  physical 
production and volumes is separated from the responsibility for financial management. 
This  has  led  to  unreconciled  differences  between  the  two.  These  differences  are 
attributed to the institutions involved—DPR, Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS),   31 
and  the  National  Nigerian  Petroleum  Company  (NNPC)—and  their  inability  to 
effectively share data and information.  
-  The  use  of  suitable  and  secure  computer-based  information  technology  systems  to 
provide consistent data  to various users and to analyze this data  is limited or often 
nonexistent.  
-  The NNPC monthly returns on crude oil sales do not indicate the volume of crude, the 
applicable  price,  the  exchange  rate  used,  and  the  method  used  for  computing  the 
proceeds.  
-  In the determination of the profits tax liability, all the joint venture companies fail to 
apply the 2000 MOU regarding the use of realizable price. Misapplication of the MOU 
provisions  revealed  significant  differences  in  tax  liability  leading  to  additional 
assessments. 
-  Some companies claimed capital allowances on construction in progress. The argument 
was that paragraph 15 of the second schedule to the Petroleum Profits Tax Act allows 
for the claiming of capital allowances from the moment the expenditure is incurred, 
rather than when the asset is first put to use.  
-  The  NEITI  audit  indicated  potentially  significant  petroleum  profits  tax  under 
assessments in relation to operating expenses, intangible drilling and development costs, 
investment tax allowance, and capital allowance on non-associated gas. In several areas, 
the legislation is unclear as to how the liabilities and allowances should be computed. 
Spending Resource Wealth 
88.  Nigeria‘s fiscal system, in particular the arrangements for sharing federally collected revenue 
among the three tiers of government, has undergone several changes since independence (for details, 
see  World  Bank  2007).  Fiscal  federalism  was  revived  in  1999  at  the  start  of  the  Obasanjo 
administration.  In principle, all oil revenues collected at the federal level are paid into the CRF and 
then  shared among  the  three tiers of government.  Under the  budget reform program  of 2003, 
however, the government began using an oil-price-based fiscal rule. A reference price for oil is set 
annually and oil revenues accrue to the CRF in line with this oil price. Revenue derived from oil 
prices that are higher than the reference price is put into the excess crude account (ECA). The oil-
price-based  fiscal  rule  delinks  expenditures  from  current  oil  revenues  and  is  meant  to  create  a 
contingent stabilization fund. If implemented properly and in combination with prudent budgeting 
and expenditure programs, the rule is expected to promote good governance and sound fiscal policy 
in  the  oil-dependent  country.  The  new  fiscal  institution  has  faced  stiff  challenges  but  held  up 
throughout the fierce political storms.    32 
89.  Nonetheless, fiscal rules have been relaxed over time.  While the excess crude oil account 
maintained to some extent fiscal discipline in early years of the establishment of the ECA which 
supported growth in domestic demand and the GDP during the global financial crisis of 2009, over 
time, the pressure from states to share the resources brewed up.  The country was unable to rein in 
the stimulus spending of 2009 and a further fiscal extension in 2010 quickly depleted the remaining 
ECA reserves (World Bank 2011b).  To create sustainable rules and institutions to manage the 
country‘s oil wealth, the government has been working on building a political consensus for the 
establishment of a new Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) which is proposed to divide the funds into 
three separate components:  (a) a stabilization component for protecting the budget against a fall in 
oil prices, (b) an infrastructure component for key areas of public investment, and (c) a savings 
component.   
90.  The first call on the oil revenue in the CRF is for derivation payments. Currently, 13 percent 
of oil revenue is paid to the oil-producing states in the form of ―derivation.‖ Oil-producing states 
have lobbied hard for an increase in the derivation amount, even though, under the current regime, 
per capita revenues for oil-producing states are significantly higher than allocations for non-oil-
producing states (Freinkman 2007). After derivation, the remaining funds in the CRF are shared 
between  the  three  tiers  of  government  according  to  a  formula  proposed  by  the  RMAFC  and 
approved by Parliament. The current formula, which has been used since February 2004, allocates 
52.68  percent  to  the  FGN,  26.72  percent  to  state  governments  and  20.60  percent  to  local 
governments.
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a.  Revenue Management and Allocation 
91.  The budget process starts from the executive arm of government when the Budget Office of 
the  Federation  (BOF),  a  department  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF),  issues  a  Call  Circular, 
requesting the ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to prepare and submit their estimates 
for  the  next  fiscal  year.  Until  the  2003  economic  reforms,  the  estimates  were  little  more  than 
wishlists from the various MDAs. Following the 2003 budget reforms, however, MDAs had to 
formulate their estimates within an envelope determined by the government based on its high policy 
priorities. Adoption of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) together with the oil-
price-based  fiscal  rule  aims to achieve  budget discipline and prioritization of expenditures. The 
budget  estimates  as  agreed  on  by  the  executive  go  to  the  National  Assembly,  where  various 
committees of the Senate and House of Representatives responsible for MDA oversight examine the 
relevant estimates and make recommendations to the Appropriations Committee of their respective 
chambers. 
92.  Once passed, the MOF through the Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation 
(OAGF)  ensures  releases  of  appropriations  to  the  MDAs  for  budget  implementation.  The 
Procurement  Commission  (formerly  Budget  Monitoring  and  Price  Intelligence  Unit)  monitors 
expenditures  to  ensure  competitive  pricing  and  value  for  money  in  the  expenditure  of  funds. 
Through  the  BOF,  the  MOF  monitors  implementation  on  behalf  of  the  executive,  while  the 
Oversight  Committees  of  the  two  chambers  of  the  National  Assembly  also  carry  out  periodic 
monitoring and evaluation. Civil society organizations also participate in the monitoring of budget 
execution through their initiatives or through participation in public hearings periodically conducted   33 
by the National Assembly upon receipt of complaints from the public or as part of the oversight 
activities of committees. 
93.  Despite these layers of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, there is very little effective 
monitoring of public expenditures in Nigeria. As the energy sector probe conducted in April–May 
2008 revealed, considerable funds were used out for energy projects under National Independent 
Power  Projects  scheme  without  obtaining  due  process  certification  or  any  guarantees  that  the 
projects would be executed.
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94.  At the state level, the State House of Assembly (SHA) authorizes the budget, but it is the 
governor who initiates the process by ensuring that the MDAs prepare estimates that he forwards to 
the SHA. The SHA also has committees that monitor and evaluate budget performance together 
with inputs from civil society organizations, but with even lesser effectiveness than at the federal 
level. The governor dominates the SHA for various reasons. Each governor is the main, if not sole, 
financier  of  his  political  party  in  his  state.  He  leverages  his  financial  control  to  maintain  a 
stranglehold  on  the  party  machinery  and  the  legislature.  The  lack  of  effectiveness  in  budget 
monitoring and evaluation also reflects the fact that the states actually raise little revenue on their 
own. With the exception of Lagos State, allocation from the Federation Account is by far the largest 
component of state revenues accounting for as much as 85 percent, while the next largest source 
(valued added  tax)  is  federally collected  (Barkan, Gboyega,  and Stevens  2001,  29).  For  the  oil-
producing states, an additional 13 percent derivation fund pushes Internally Generated Revenue to a 
distant fourth.  
95.  Local governments run a presidential system, which mirrors the structure of government at 
the state and federal levels. Budgeting follows the same pattern as the higher levels of government. 
Elected councils, however, are much less capable of performing their oversight role and holding the 
local government chair accountable. Thus, very little of the transfers to local government councils 
translates into capital projects and services (Aluko 2006; HRW 2007).   34 
Box 1. The Relationship between Spending Decisions and Sector Performance 
Significant budget expenditures in the past did not always bring improvement in service delivery. 
  Health: It is estimated that total spending in the sector (public and private) exceeds 6 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is rather high by international standards. However, the health outcomes 
remain extremely low and have not improved over the years. Infant and maternal mortality rates remain high 
at  110  and 8  per  1,000  births  in  2005,  respectively. Moreover,  infant mortality increased  by  20  percent 
between  1990  and  2005  (Nigeria  2006  MDGs  Report).  Communicable  diseases  (particularly malaria  and 
diarrhea) are the main causes of mortality, which can be easily prevented or treated at relatively low cost.  
  Education: The education sector has been attracting a significant amount of funding over the last four to five 
years from all tiers of the government without much change in social indicators. This significantly improved 
net primary enrollment. Also, the share of the primary school students that reach grade five increased from 
71 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2005 (Nigeria 2006 MDGs Report). But the quality of nation‘s teaching 
and schooling remains of concern, and this is reflected in poor literacy outcomes. Adult literacy rate was only 
64 percent in 2004.  
  Roads: Inadequate funding for maintenance, rehabilitation, and asset renewal during the previous decades is 
the major reason for high transportation costs and poor safety conditions. It is estimated that between 50 and 
70 percent of road network is in poor condition (Willoughby 2007). The FGN recently has increased funding 
for the sector to address the problem.  
  Power: In 2001–05, the federal government spent, through investment grants, subsidies, and loans in the 
sector, about N270 billion or more than US$2 billion, while the massive power shortages remain the major 
development constraint for the private sector and a critical social problem. A partial explanation for this low 
impact of budget spending relates to the low completion rate of initiated investment projects in the sector. 
The value of unfinished construction has increased by N82 billion since 2000.  
Source: World Bank 2007, 33. 
b.  Sustainable Development Policies and Projects: Impact of Public Expenditures 
96.  The impact of Nigeria‘s public expenditure does not compare favorably with those of other 
oil-producing  countries.  A  World  Bank  report  (2007,  33)  estimated  that  Nigeria‘s  historical 
incremental capital output ratio at 12.7% ―was very high, more than double that of a better managed 
oil  economy  such  as  Indonesia.‖  Nigeria‘s  low  average  efficiency  of  government  spending  was 
attributed to mismanagement under military rule.  
97.  This corroborates the view that waste (particularly in the oil sector), more than the Dutch 
disease, explains the low real GDP growth of Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003) pointed out that oil revenues were used to enhance physical capital 
accumulation between 1973 and 1980 when two major oil price shocks occurred. The capital stock 
grew an average of 14 percent per year, totaling a threefold increase in capital stock in eight years. At 
the  same  time,  public  investment  as  a  share  of  GDP  rose  to  7  percent.  Conversely,  capacity 
utilization in manufacturing (mostly government owned) started to decline from an average of about 
77 percent in 1975 to about 50 percent in 1983, and even more so since then.    35 
98.  Thus, Nigeria increased physical capital investments using oil revenues during the period of 
oil price windfalls, but it experienced diminished capacity to manage them (Bevan 1998, 67). This 
historical problem has persisted until now because, until 2004, no serious efforts were made to 
tackle it. As the World Bank report (2007) notes, ―the core problem within Nigeria‘s budget system 
is low efficiency of budget spending, not inadequate amount of funding.‖ (See appendix E for 
efficiency problems of public investment in the core social and economic infrastructure sectors.) 
Although oil revenues are not enough to achieve Nigeria‘s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and the targets established in the government‘s seven-point reform agenda and Vision 2020, the 
country‘s  development  has  long  been  hampered  by  inefficiency  in  public  investment,  lagging 
structural reforms, and chronic problem with shortage of infrastructure. In this context, the World 
Bank  recently  had  to  demonstrate  to  creditors  that  Nigeria‘s  level  of  debt  servicing  was  not 
consistent with its achievement of the MDGs. As a result, the creditors agreed to write off 60 
percent of Nigeria‘s debt (IEG 2009). 
99.  Poor budget implementation has been a source of concern to the government since 2003. 
Noteworthy  reforms  have  been  adopted  to  try  to  correct  the  anomaly.  Among  the  measures 
undertaken are efforts to ensure budget discipline and predictability by (i) adopting an oil-price-
based fiscal rule to facilitate excess crude savings, (ii) aligning budgeting and public expenditures to 
policies and the MTEF, and (iii) establishing the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit 
(now the Procurement Commission) to enforce procurement rules. The BOF‘s role in the budget 
process has been enhanced. The BOF has since 2005 required MDAs to formulate medium-term 
sector  strategies  (MTSS).  This  process  articulates  precise  sector  strategic  goals,  objectives, 
performance indicators, and monitoring and evaluation plans. A Fiscal Responsibility Law has been 
passed, which will anchor sound and prudent management of public revenues. 
100.  Most of these measures have applied, until very recently, only to the federal level. Increased 
budget  transparency,  fiscal  responsibility  bills,  and  procurement  bills  only  recently  have  been 
implemented at the state level. Given the high degree of fiscal federalism in Nigeria, it is crucial that 
budget implementation improves at the subnational level. This also extends to local governments, 
which are, among other things, responsible for delivering basic education and health services. 
101.  Nevertheless, budget implementation remains a major issue. The extent of capital budget 
implementation has been declining since 2005, when performance went down from 88 percent to 
just less than 44 percent in 2008. The reasons for the poor performance, according to a cabinet 
investigation committee report, included (i) lack of familiarity and understanding of extant laws, 
regulations, and guidelines on project execution by the MDAs; (ii) delays in obtaining approvals of 
ministers and permanent secretaries for various stages of the procurement process (iii) delays in 
processing  payments;  (iv)  challenges  in  documentation;  and  (v)  delays  in  processing  memos  to 
council (BOF 2008). Thus, low efficiency and inadequate capacity in the bureaucracy is a major 
cause of poor economic performance and of Nigeria‘s failure to derive maximum benefit from its oil 
resources.   36 
IV.  Framework for Reform  
102.  Since the Second National Development Plan, Nigeria has aspired to be economically strong 
and to be able to provide social welfare and equal opportunities for all its citizens. Reforms intended 
to check corruption, ensure accountability of public officials, and make economic management more 
efficient resonate with the public. This environment fostered the reforms of the 2003–07.  During 
the  second  Obasanjo  administration  starting  in  2003,  the  government  produced  the  National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which articulated a new economic 
reform agenda. The state and local governments also were encouraged to produce State Economic 
Empowerment  and  Development  Strategy  (SEEDS)  and  Local  Economic  Empowerment  and 
Development Strategy (LEEDS). The reforms are wide ranging, covering financial sector, PFM, and 
public sector service delivery. The economic reforms of the Obasanjo period initially were opposed 
because of their novelty. They were embraced eventually, however, and members of the economic 
reform team remained good public managers until the end of the administration. 
103.  More recently, the Yar‘Adua administration in 2008 announced an ambitious program aimed 
at ensuring that Nigeria becomes 1 of the 20 most industrialized countries in the world by the year 
2020. Named Vision 20-2020, the blueprint integrates President Yar‘Adua‘s campaign manifesto (the 
Seven Point Agenda), NEEDS II, and the MDG programs. It sets targets of US$900 billion GDP 
and $4,000 per capita income within the next 12 years. The recent reforms focus on achieving good 
sector governance and sound fiscal policy, based on three key pillars: manage the cyclical uncertainty 
and unpredictability of oil production and price (delink expenditures from current oil revenues), 
reform public procurements, and improve transparency and disclosure (see Figure 7). This section 
emphasizes the NEITI initiative, reviews challenges and opportunities to reforms, and draws some 
broad policy implications.  
Figure 7: Nigeria’s Current Reform Framework for the Oil Sector  
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The NEITI  
104.  Nigeria was one of the first countries to sign the global EITI and is now EITI compliant. 
Transparency in the oil and gas sector fit well into the Obasanjo administration‘s stated fight against 
corruption, which was evident in the creation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC)  and  the  Independent  Corrupt  Practices  Commission  (ICPC).  Anticorruption  and 
transparency featured prominently in the overall emphasis on good governance and due process.  
105.  One of NEITI‘s first steps was to commission a comprehensive audit (financial, physical, 
and process) of the oil and gas industry for the period 1999–2004. This audit, which was finalized in 
2006, remains in scope and detail the gold standard of global EITI. A second audit for the 2005 with 
the same scope is about to be published and the audits for the years 2006-2008 was contracted out 
during 2010. Following the publication of the audit, the Federal Executive Council agreed on a set 
of priority actions to remedy the shortfalls identified through the audits. The resulting Remediation 
Action Plan was subject to implementation by the Interministerial Task Team (IMTT), including 
representatives  of  relevant  agencies  chaired  by  NEITI.  Although  some  limited  progress  in 
interagency  collaboration  and  information  sharing  has  been  made,  the  IMTT  has  been  largely 
ineffective—reflecting low-level membership of the IMTT, limited actual power of NEITI, and, to a 
lesser extent, difficulties in securing funding for remediation.  
106.  More fundamentally, several of the remedial actions envisaged under the action plan touch 
on sensitive issues in the industry and are expected to meet significant resistance. The best example 
is the issue of metering. The audits noted that Nigeria lacks an up-to-date metering system, with 
metering only taking place at the export terminal. Losses due to bunkering and pipeline vandalism, 
however, currently are not quantifirf because of the lack of proper metering. Any attempt to institute 
metering would affect vested interests in the sector and thus would need strong political support to 
succeed.  
107.  In 2007, the NEITI Act was passed, which made Nigeria the first country with a legal 
framework for the implementation of EITI. However, EITI implementation in Nigeria has been 
difficult over the last three years, because of bureaucratic delays, differences in power sharing and 
responsibilities between the NEITI secretariat and National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG), and 
the lack of strong political leadership. It appears that political commitment to NEITI continued 
under the  Yar‘Adua–Jonathan administration. NEITI fits well  within the administration‘s stated 
objective of following due process and the rule of law, as well as fighting corruption and promoting 
transparency. This being said, the administration has been slow to follow up on NEITI and its actual 
support has been uncertain. Within NEITI, the current leadership lacks strong political backing and 
has failed to form strong alliances, for example, with influential ministers such as those for finance 
and petroleum. 
108.  A complicating factor is the emergence of a sector governance reform agenda unrelated to 
NEITI.  President  Yar‘Adua,  picking  up  on  work  that  had  started  under  the  Obasanjo 
administration, prioritized improving governance in the oil and gas sector. The PIB- is the most 
tangible outcome of this work, which is currently under consideration in the National Assembly. 
This piece of legislation aims to replace all existing legislation on oil and gas sector issues and 
fundamentally revamp the institutional setup in the industry. The most visible outcome would be the   38 
breakup of the powerful NNPC. More importantly, the bill aims to clearly divide regulatory and 
commercial activities and create a number of new agencies. It also would change the  fiscal regime 
for  the  sector.  The  oil  industry  opposes  the  bill  in  its  current  form  because  it  would  create 
significant uncertainty for the industry,for instance, by not specifying in detail the new fiscal regime. 
NEITI,  in  principle,  would  be well placed  to support the  passage of the bill, as NEITI audits 
provide independent evidence for the need for many of the reforms envisaged under the bill.  
Improvements in the Judiciary  
109.  The judiciary has shown that with appropriate reforms and good leadership, checks and 
balances can be restored between the three arms of government. The 1999 Constitution establishes a 
National Judicial Council (NJC), which is a clearing house for the appointment of judges. At the 
federal level, it collects and disburses the judiciary‘s budget. Consequently, the judiciary is more 
insulated from manipulation by the executive using budgetary control. The judiciary‘s leadership has 
taken advantage of these reforms to express its independence. It has decided against the government 
in some landmark cases. The NJC is empowered to sanction erring judges, a power it has exercised 
effectively to instill discipline in the judiciary. Several judges at the federal and state levels have been 
dismissed because of complaints by aggrieved parties.
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110.  A number of important cases highlight that Nigeria‘s court system has started to go against 
the government and the political level in general when they have legal justification to do so. The 
judiciary has, for example, supported a state when it had not received statutory funding from the 
federal level and it has reacted against the executive‘s misuse of power to allocate and reallocate 
political positions. When the federal level demanded that states make returns of expenditure of local 
funds  to  a  federal  agency,  the  judiciary  nullified  the  arrangement.  The  judiciary  has  kept 
opportunities  open  for  political  candidates  who  have  been  disqualified  unjustly  by  the  election 
committee. These important developments have occurred despite incentives in Nigerian politics.  
Reform Prospects  
111.  The likelihood of success of reform initiatives must be considered in light of a still very weak 
democracy and the resilience of the pro-reform activists in Nigeria. Their relentless struggles forced 
the military back into the barracks and ensured return to civil democratic rule in 1999. Even though 
they were  politically  ousted  subsequently  by strategic  failure to directly contest for power, they 
remain influential because of the attractiveness of the role they envision for Nigeria in regional and 
global affairs.   
112.  The  government  is  striving  to  ensure  effective  monitoring  of  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  state  development  plans  and  budgets.  Seizing  the  window  of  opportunity 
provided by the incessant requests by the states to draw from the excess crude account, the National 
Planning  Commission  (NPC)  had  proposed  a  scheme  for  monitoring  and  evaluating  state 
expenditures. The Nigerian Governors Forum proactively embraced the review concept but opted 
to carry it out independently of the NPC. This has been approved by the National Council of State   39 
and the NGF is contemplating a state peer-review mechanism, similar to the African Peer Review 
Mechanism.  When  it  becomes  operational,  citizens  will  have  an  opportunity  of  independent 
assessment of the performance of their state governments.  
113.  As discussed in section 2, there is an element of hope in the potentials for using the judiciary 
as a check against arbitrary acts at the federal level. Courts are independent and have remarkably 
managed to self-improve despite a challenging political environment. These many positive signals 
have to be considered in light of obstacles and institutional weaknesses.  
114.  However, if Nigeria is to escape from the resource curse trap, it must carry out reforms at 
the level of the political economy and the oil industry regulatory framework. Sorely needed  are 
constitutional and electoral reforms to ensure that elections are credible and confer legitimacy on the 
government. Neither of this is likely to happen in the way that will guarantee optimal outcomes. 
Constitutional and electoral reforms promised by the government are dragging. Electoral reforms, 
especially, is threatening to the government and will not be carried out as recommended by the 
presidential panel on electoral reform. Nigeria has opted to return to national planning, but the 
planning machinery is weak and needs to be revamped. NPC has capacity gaps that can undermine 
its  ability  to  effectively  anchor  the  new  national  development  plan  and  the  Vision  20-20-20 
implementation. The Budget Office needs enhanced capacity for budget monitoring and evaluation, 
while MDAs need more capacity-building on budget implementation. The DPR has serious capacity 
gaps, which affect the performance of its regulatory functions. In addition, it lacks the necessary 
infrastructure to perform. FIRS also needs capacity enhancement to be able to cope with oil sector 
accounting  complexities.  Finally,  the  NEITI  secretariat  requires  strengthening  to  exercise  the 
extensive powers vested in it. 
115.  Notwithstanding  all  the reform efforts since  1999,  there  remain formidable obstacles to 
creating  a  sustainable environment  for  transparency  in  the  management  of  natural  resources  in 
Nigeria. The potentials of reforming each phase of the value chain vary and will be shaped by the 
differential array of forces, interests, obstacles and opportunities. Rent beneficiaries will fight to keep 
their stake or minimize their losses from any reform effort.  
116.  Nigeria‘s political structure makes any reform inherently difficult. The National Assembly 
comprises 360 members from 36 states, grouped into six geo-political zones constantly competing 
with one another for greater share of national resources. With respect to the Niger Delta question, 
for example, the key issue of attaching an enhanced weight to the derivation principle is unlikely to 
be resolved in their favor as the nine states in the region have between them only 82 (22.8%) seats 
out of 360 in the House of Representative and 27 (24.8%) seats out of 109 in the Senate. Non-oil 
states know that the gain of the oil producing states is their loss, hence the longstanding stalemate in 
changing the revenue allocation formula.  
117.  The political elite is fragmented along ethnic, religious and regional lines who, in the absence 
of a strong national ideology, cannot easily agree on reforms to improve governance if personal,  
regional or sectional interests would be adversely affected. The ruling party‘s more than two-thirds 
majority in the National Assembly avails the President very little in terms of support for reforms, 
evidenced by the many reform bills pending before the National Assembly. Attempts to reintroduce 
the Freedom of Information Bill since the inauguration of the current National Assembly failed six   40 
times, each time shot down by a coalition strongly apprehensive about the strength of the press. 
However, a watered down version was passed in March 2011.  Corruption at the political level is 
perceived as a substantial challenge - and as described by Ipeke, Soludo and Elekwa (2004): “The most 
important obstacle for reform is the fact that those who are supposed to introduce measures are those who lose from the 
reform.”  
117.     Nonetheless, there are clear opportunities for reform, most notably in the attempt to get the 
PIB passed and completely change the governance structure of the petroleum sector. However, 
these  reforms  are  not  addressed  in  the  most  strategic  way,  e.g.  the  PIB  is  said  to  be  a  weak 
document that could have been much improved before submission to Parliament. Furthermore, no 
strong inclusive alliance was built early on that would have helped in passing the bill. This allows 
strong powerful elites to tamper with the bill while it is being read. Even if the bill passes, it remains 
unclear how much it will change petroleum governance. A number of very good laws have been 
passed in the Parliament in Nigeria over the last years, but their implementation has been difficult 
because of strong opposition. 
Policy Implications 
118.      The assessment of political economy and the oil sector reform prospects draws out some 
broad policy measures as follows.  
 
119.  The dynamics of the Nigerian politics indicates that while appropriate strategy and adequate 
resources for reforms are necessary, they are insufficient for the reforms to sustain and succeed. The 
reforms have to be driven from within, relying on the government‘s leadership or effective pressure 
from CSOs / media or both.   
 
120.  EITI is an important step forward to better governance of the sector.  Nevertheless, it is 
inefficient without commensurate reforms across various stages of the value chain.  The Nigerian 
experience with the EITI indicates that internationally, to be effective, the global EITI need to 
diffuse from audits to remedial measures (e.g. actually following up on the findings of the audits in 
terms of improving various aspects along the value chain). 
 
121.  Enhancing  inter-governmental  fiscal  arrangement,  transparency  and  accountability  for 
service delivery at the state level is critical for the long-term growth and development.  Freinkman 
(2007) highlights the urgency for multi-faceted reforms.  The reforms must strengthen the incentives 
of  government  agencies  at  all  levels  of  authority  to  improve  cooperation  in  designing  and 
implementing  their  policies  and  build  capacity  to  support  such  future  inter-governmental 
cooperation.  The World Bank (2009a) also emphasizes the need for enhancing governance at all 
levels (and in particular at the state level) but recognizes that improving governance and capacity will 
be a long term process.  The fragmented milieu of the country‘s politics and the discretionary power 
of state governments in determining the quality of public investment and service delivery require 
that the central government show the necessary leadership and successfully leverage the resources at 
its disposal to provide incentives to state governments to enhance delivery of social services (IEG, 
2009).  Some seeds of reforms at the state level have been planted:  states are beginning to pass fiscal   41 
responsibility bills, procurement bills, reforming their budget processes, and increasing transparency. 
 
122.  The renewed effort by the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan to bring under 
control  the  long-standing  resource  control  conflict  in  Niger  Delta  is  strategically  critical.  
Nonetheless, resource allocation is neither the single nor the most important determinant in this 
prioritized strategy.  Unless the relatively high youth unemployment in the region – which provides 
the recruiting ground for the militant groups is alleviated and local service delivery, transparency and 
accountability enhanced, any interventions – military included -- by the central government would 
prove  fruitless  or  short-lived.  The  World  Bank  forthcoming  operation  (World  Bank  2011a)  to 
enhance  opportunities  for  youth  employment  and  access  to  socio-economic  services  while 
improving public expenditure management systems at the state level is expected to contribute to the 
overall resolution for uprooting the perpetual resource control conflict, especially in the Niger Delta 
region. 
 
123.  The  international  community  can  support  by  demanding  transparency,  raising  questions 
about deviation from agreed upon procedures and pointing at gaps between welfare goals and actual 
policy.   
 
124.  The donor community could play a major role to better governance of the oil sector even 
though the ODA accounts for just a small share of the government‘s budget.  Objective advice, 
analytical and policy support, assistance to build institutional capacity and meaningful investment 
programs  to  fill  the  gap  in  the  chronic  inadequacy  of  the  country‘s  infrastructure  that  hinders 
sustainable non-oil sector growth – all could be combined within a coherent development strategy to 
help the country on the path to economic and social progress.  The World Bank has recently taken 
an increasingly strategic view of engagement at reforms at the state level concurrently with the effort 
to support capacity and institution building.   
V.  Conclusion  
125.  Nigeria‘s prospects for achieving its development agenda of becoming 1 of the 20 most 
industrialized nations by 2020 may appear daunting under the present circumstances. The country‘s 
development efforts are hobbled by poor infrastructure, human capacity inadequacies, corruption, 
weak institutions, flawed elections, and unaccountable leadership. Prolonged military rule weakened 
progress toward political good governance and left deep political and social divisions, which current 
leaders are struggling to overcome. Nevertheless, a lot of progress has been achieved since 1999, 
when the military handed over power to democratically elected leadership. Several reforms have 
been completed to restructure politics, reform governance, improve management of the economy, 
and  ensure  transparency  and  accountability  in  governance.  125.  This  chapter‘s  analysis  of  the 
political  economy  shows  that  a  lot  still  needs  to  be  done  to  overcome  Nigeria‘s  development 
challenges,  especially  in  petroleum  sector  governance  and  in  the  political  process.  Attempts  to 
introduce  competitive  bidding  in  petroleum  licensing  have  produced  mixed  results,  primarily 
because of the sector‘s deeply rooted political and economic interests. Similarly, efforts to reform 
the  industry‘s  regulatory  framework  have  stalled  as  the  government  has  found  it  difficult  to 
unbundle its holding company, the NNPC, and to ensure transparency of the regulators. Above all, 
many Nigerian regulators were once industry operators seconded or retired from the IOCs and,   42 
therefore, are familiar with the operators. Nigeria embraced EITI, passed a law to institutionalize the 
initiative,  and  conducted  physical  and  process  audits  of  the  oil  industry.  It  has  been  difficult, 
however, to implement the recommendations of NEITI audits and this is not unconnected to the 
underlying political economy of  the sector. NEITI reports reveal the weaknesses in the oil industry 
revenue collection machinery. Although Nigeria‘s fiscal regime compares favorably with those of 
other oil-producing countries, it suffers from overlaps and contradictions and inconsistencies. The 
main  institutions  involved  in  revenue  collection-  NNPC,  DPR,  and  FIRS-  experience  capacity 
inadequacies, do not coordinate their efforts, and are liable to political pressures.  The Niger Delta 
conflict,  criminal  activities,  and  oil  theft  or  bunkering  are  mutually  reinforcing  in  a  seemingly 
perpetual cycle which resists all sorts of previous intermittent military, amnesty, and rehabilitation 
interventions. 
126.  Expenditure of oil revenues is no less problematic, producing an impact that falls short of 
those  in  other oil-producing  countries.  The ability  to achieve  healthy  economic growth rates is 
hampered by low capacity to manage oil revenues, wasteful expenditures, lagging structural reforms, 
and infrastructure inadequacy. These shortcomings are attributable to and deepened by a political 
economy that sustains weak institutions, elections lacking credibility, unaccountable leadership that 
is not overly concerned with public welfare, and political processes prone to violence. Nigerian 
leaders have struggled since 1999 to reverse these trends, and some successes have been recorded. 
The judiciary has self-reformed and started to assert its independence from the executive, giving 
greater  assurance  that  the  rule  of  law  is  achievable.  Reforms  at  the  federal  level—of  public 
expenditure management, fight against corruption, NEITI, fiscal responsibility, and procurement 
legislation—give much promise that Nigeria could improve its political economy and prospects for 
development.  Yet,  these  reforms  need  to  be  sustained,  deepened  and  reinforced  and  must  be 
addressed not as purely technocratic matters but rather as issues of political economy and vested 
interests that through regulation and reform must be aligned with the public interest.  
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1 By contrast, in Malaysia, which is another oil-producing economy with a large population, gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita is almost five times higher than in the 1970s.  
2 Total installed capacity for electricity is 6,000 megawatts while generation and transmission have been below 2,000 
megawatts since early 2009. According to the MAN, 820 firms have closed down between 2000 and 2008. The main   46 
                                                                                                                                                             
reasons for the collapse of the firms are said to be unstable electricity, high interest and exchange rates, smuggling, high 
cost of AGO and LPFO to power generators or boilers, and multiple taxation by the three tiers of government. 
3 A joint United Nations–World Bank initiative to prevent the theft of state revenues and money laundering.  
4 The statement issued by the International Observer Delegation fielded by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on 
April 23, 2007, on the presidential election of April 14, 2007, noted that the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. 
It stated emphatically that the serious problems witnessed substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral 
process. This is in accordance with a statement of the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Nigeria‘s 
April 21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections, Abuja, April 23, 2007. 
5 In accordance with theories by Ross (1999; 2001), Robinson et al., (2006)  
6 For discussion about political spending based on petroleum revenues versus taxation and accountability, see Devarajan 
et al. (2010), and Brautigam et al. (2008).  
7 For a review of best practice with respect to checks and balances and how these are secured in Norway, see Al-Kasim 
(2006).  
8 There are some amendments in the 1999 constitution that seemed to reduce executive control (related to the derivation 
percentage), yet in reality the unchecked executive control on the petroleum sector could continue (see Gillies, 2008a, 
2008b).  
9 From inception, the minister and permanent secretary of the Petroleum Ministry could not agree on who should head 
the NNOC (Turner 1978). This has been the pattern since then. During the Second Republic, the House of 
Representative passed a motion declaiming Yoruba domination of the NNPC. As a result, the government reshuffled 
the top echelons of the corporation to try to restore ethnic balance (Gboyega 1985). 
10 At the exchange rate of N150 to US$1. 
11 Regarding motivation for Nuhu Ribadu‘s removal, at the end of the Obasanjo administration, the EFCC likely was 
used to go after political opponents. This rumor may have made it difficult for Ribadu to continue.  
12 This figure was given in a speech delivered by the Minister of Energy (Petroleum), Odein Ajumogobia, on behalf of 
President Umaru Musa Yar‘Adua at the Oil and Gas Conference and Mini-Exhibition at Port Harcourt on July 10, 2008 
(see the Leadership (Abuja) 2008, 1–2). 
13 For example, pipeline vandals were arrested in Ajaawa, a rural community in Oyo State on December 11, 2007. 
Similarly, 22 pipeline vandals were arrested in Anambra and 118 others in Rivers State in January 2008 (Punch 2008). 
14 In an article for the Financial Times, Dr. Dele Cole, a former presidential aspirant and presidential adviser (1999–2001) 
from the Rivers State observed that it is commonly believed in the Nigerian military that ―you will never find a poor 
admiral.‖ 
15 The key relevant legislation related to regulating gas flaring includes: (1) Hydrocarbons legislation: 1969 Petroleum Act 
and Regulations, as amended; Model Petroleum Contract; Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1979; Associated Gas 
Reinjection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations 1985; The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Amendment Decree 
1988; and (2) Environmental legislation: Effluent Limitation Regulations 1991; DPR Environmental Guidelines and 
Standards for the Petroleum Industry 1991; FEPA EIA Guidelines for E&P Projects 1994, Decree No. 58/88 (World 
Bank n.d.). 
16 The joint donor assessment f the policy priorities for 2011 and beyond (World Bank 2011b) highlights the critical 
problem of the youth unemployment.  The 15-35 year age cohort accounts for nearly 60 percent of population 
nationwide.  Although they account for only a third of the workforce, they account for almost two-thirds of the 
unemployed. 
17 See HRW (2007) for a broad discussion about the violence and explanatory factors.  
18 Natural resource endowment, especially oil, is associated with civil conflicts according to Fearon and Laitin, (2005) 
and Collier and Hoeffler (2005), and Nigeria supports the correlation.  
19 There are several studies of how and why violence developed—and how it was escalated, for example, by IOCs paying 
groups for ―protection,‖ which created adverse incentives to increase kidnappings and violence.    47 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Since the Kaima Declaration Proclamations similar to the Kaima Declaration have been made by many other groups, 
such as, the Oron (Bill of Rights of the Oron People), the Egi people (The Aklaka Declaration), the Ikwerre (The 
Ikwerre Rescue Charter), the Urhobo (Urhobo Economic Summit), the Isoko, Ilaje, and many other oil-producing 
communities. The various demands of the Niger Delta peoples are now summarized in the Manifesto of the Niger Delta 
People, see appendix A. 
21 The Truth and Reconciliation Committee was set up to seek peace by Rotimi Amaechi, current governor of Rivers 
State, in May–June 2008 
22 By 2007, NDDC funds not released by the Presidency amounted to about N240 billion. President Yar‘Adua rebuffed 
the entreaties of Niger Delta National Assembly members and Governors that the withheld NDDC funds be released, 
arguing that the funds had lapsed with the financial years during which they were withheld by his predecessor. According 
to the 2005 NEITI Report, payments by IOCs to the NDDC fell short by $50.615 and N1.2 billion for that year (NEITI 
2009). 
23 For a review of corruption in oil regulation specifically, see Al Kasim, Søreide, and Williams (2008) and McPherson 
and MacSerraigh (2007). For a review of how corruption may happen in procurement in general, see Della Porta and 
Vannucci (1999), Moody-Stuart (1997), or Rose-Ackerman (1999). Some forms of corruption may seek to exploit a host 
country‘s aim to give preference to license applicants with national participation. National companies can sometimes be 
a façade for local politicians and officials. 
24 The 2009 budget estimates these sales at Nigerian naira (N) 1.8 trillion or 58 percent of all oil revenues. 
25 Current royalty rates are governed by 1999 ―Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production- sSharing cContracts Decree 
No. 9.‖. This law sets out the general framework for the operation of production-sharing contracts (PSCs), including the 
applicable royalties, tax regimes, and the manner in which costs and profits are allocated between the parties. This law 
provides for the following royalty rate structure. In areas from 201 to 500 meters water depth, the royalty rate is 12% 
percent, from 501 to 800 meters it is 8% percent, from 801 to 1,000 meters it is 4% percent.  and It then it drops to 0% 
percent when depth exceeds 1,000 meters. The royalty rate payable under the Production Sharing Contracts PSCs in the 
Inland Basin shall be a flat 10% percent. A rate of 20% percent is applicable for onshore drilling. 
26 Profits tax is applied both on joint ventures (JVs) and production sharing agreements (PSAs). Tax is applied on 
company‘s profits based on sales proceeds adjusted for expenses and allowable deductions. These deductions include 
royalty payment, interest on debt, and capital consumption allowances. Losses are allowed to be carried forward. Tax is 
assessed at the rate of 85% percent. However, companies that have not fully amortized their pre-preproduction 
capitalized expenditures are subject to tax at the rate of 67.75% percent for a period of 5five years after which the 
normal rate of 85% percent shall apply. The capital allowances, however, are limited such that a company‘s tax liability is 
not reduced below 15% percent and the remainder is carried forward indefinitely. Thus, effectively 15% percent 
becomes the minimum tax liability for an oil company. Dividends are exempted from withholding tax. 
27 There are some special provisions for production sharing agreements. The ―Deep Offshore and Inland Basin 
Production- sharing contracts Decree No. 9‖ of 1999 provides for payment of a flat rate of 50% percent tax on 
petroleum profits by PSC operators. Under a PSC, every petroleum company has to pay signature and production 
bonuses that are determined as per the terms of the production sharing contract (PSC). The PSC also indicates the 
duration of the contract (generally 30 years) and any limits on cost recovery and profit oil split between the government 
and the company. These contracts also lay down the rate of capital depreciation. Exploration costs are generally are 
expensed and development costs are depreciated over 5five years on a straight- line basis. 
28 Another executive bill is pending before the National Assembly to amend the Petroleum Profits Tax Act. This bill 
addresses several of the lapses in the upstream tax system.  
29 The RMAFC, in line with its statutory responsibilities, twice proposed a new vertical allowance formula to the 
government, but the National Assembly did not pass it during President Obasanjo‘s tenure. President Yar‘Adua 
presented it again to the National Assembly. The vertical allocation formula proposed gives the states 6 percent more 
revenue, but most of it at the expense of local governments, so effectively not much more is to be transferred to the 
subnational levels. 
30 Various estimates have been given as the total amount of money paid out to energy sector contractors during the 
period. The speaker of the House of Representative claims it was $13 billion, whereas former presidency officials claim it 
was just over $3 billion.   48 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 Most remarkable was the seven-month leadership of the Supreme Court of Nigeria by Justice Belgore, which started 
on June 14, 2006. Of his tenure, foremost constitutional lawyer, Nwabueze (2007, 343) observed that ―it was a short 
tenure that transformed the image and credibility of the judiciary among Nigerians, a tenure characterized by rare 
courage, vision and determination to salvage that ‗sensitive national organ of state‘ from the festering rot that has all but 
smothered public confidence in it.‖  